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Abstract—Cyber security is one of the most significant chal-
lenges in connected vehicular systems and connected vehicles
are prone to different cybersecurity attacks that endanger pas-
sengers’ safety. Cyber security in intelligent connected vehicles
is composed of in-vehicle security and security of inter-vehicle
communications. Security of Electronic Control Units (ECUs) and
the Control Area Network (CAN) bus are the most significant
parts of in-vehicle security. Besides, with the development of 4G
LTE and 5G remote communication technologies for vehicle-to-
everything (V2X) communications, the security of inter-vehicle
communications is another potential problem. After giving a
short introduction to the architecture of next-generation vehicles
including driverless and intelligent vehicles, this review paper
identifies a few major security attacks on the intelligent connected
vehicles. Based on these attacks, we provide a comprehensive
survey of available defences against these attacks and classify
them into four categories, i.e. cryptography, network security,
software vulnerability detection, and malware detection. We also
explore the future directions for preventing attacks on intelligent
vehicle systems.
Index Terms—vehicle systems, software vulnerabilities,
VANETs, software over the air update, authentication, encryp-
tion, machine learning, deep learning, 3GPP, software defined
security, cybersecurity.
I. INTRODUCTION
The past decade has seen a rapid development of vehicular
systems in a wide variety of aspects. The complexity of
current vehicular systems, with a dramatic increase in the use
of electronic systems and wireless technology, has changed
the traditional concept of security in the automotive industry.
Moreover, the growing interest in the development of Vehicu-
lar Ad hoc Networks (VANETs) and Intelligent Transportation
Systems (ITS) has involved new security challenges and
vulnerabilities. However, long-established computer security
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policies are not followed by the industry standards for in-
vehicle and vehicular communications because of hardware
constraints and differences in network configuration [1], [2].
Previous reports have illustrated highly practical wireless
attacks on core functions of vehicles and disengaging the
engine and the brakes [3], [4], [5], [6]. For instance, by
hijacking the steering and brakes of a Ford Escape and a
Toyota Prius, Miller and Valasek indicated that a vehicle
system is not just a simple machine of glass and steel [3].
In contrast, it is important to realize that it is also a hackable
network of computers. In 2015, 1.4 million vehicles were a
subject of a recall by Chrysler because hackers could remotely
take the control of a jeep’s digital system over the internet [4].
In another report, a team of hackers remotely hijacked a Tesla
Model S from a distance of 12 miles [5]. In a recent study,
researchers have found 14 vulnerabilities in the infotainment
system in several BMW’s series [6]. Overall, these cases
support the view that security in intelligent vehicular systems
becomes essential and must be addressed in order to protect
them.
At the present time, successful cybersecurity attacks on
vehicles are mainly due to sharing information and wireless
communications that increase the susceptibility of vehicles to
different malicious attacks. Consequently, information privacy,
data privacy, securing data exchange including input and out-
put data as well as protecting Electronic Control Units (ECUs)
inside the vehicle systems are among the most significant
security and privacy issues for the intelligent vehicles [7].
In this paper, the term security encompasses attack, defence,
or vulnerability. With this in mind, some significant survey and
review studies related to the issue are mentioned below. These
works are limited only in attacks or vulnerabilities while not
focusing on defences. Mokhtar and Azab [8], Sakiz and Sen
[9], and Hasrouny et. al. [10] have focused on security attacks
of VANETs. In all the above-mentioned papers security attacks
have been focused and categorized, however, security defence
mechanisms have not been classified. Moreover, although they
have performed some good exploratory work on the network
vulnerabilities in vehicular systems, they have largely missed
the in-vehicle vulnerabilities (e.g. vulnerabilities of ECUs,
software vulnerabilities). A survey by Bernardini et al. [11]
covers security vulnerabilities in internal vehicle communica-
tions including the ECU and in gateways including the On-
Board Diagnostics (OBD), Tire Pressure Monitoring System
(TPMS), electrical charging system, Remote Keyless System
(RKS), and infotainment system. However, it should be noted
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2that they have not mentioned about defence mechanisms and
techniques.
Despite a few published survey papers that cover the secu-
rity attacks or security vulnerabilities in vehicles, far too little
attention has been paid to the defences. We aim at present-
ing a detailed analysis of security attacks and challenges in
intelligent vehicle systems and their possible related defences.
Currently, security defences in in-vehicle and inter-vehicular
communications have not been given enough attention and to
the best of our knowledge, no previous study has classified
current defences against cyber security attacks on vehicles.
For the purpose of paper selection, a search of IEEE Xplore
Digital Library, Google Scholar, ScienceDirect, and Springer
databases with different combinations of following queries was
performed: vehicle, security attack, VANET, intelligent trans-
portation system, EEA, LiDAR, ECU, TPMS, OBD, RKS,
CAN, MOST, machine learning, SVM, Markov chain model,
malware, cryptography, symmetric encryption, asymmetric en-
cryption, intrusion detection, software vulnerability detection,
mutation testing, lightweight authentication, V2X, LiFi, 3GPP,
software defined security, deep learning, intelligent, CNN,
LSTM.
Search results were papers only in English. We screened
titles and abstracts of the papers manually and we selected the
papers considering their quality. In this way, we focused on
papers from Q1 journals based on SCIMAGO INSTITUTION
RANKINGS or Conference A* and A papers based on Core
Conference Portal and we included related high-quality papers
as more as possible. As a matter of fact, we have included
other papers where we have not found related Q1, A*, or A
papers. Moreover, as old papers may not relevant today, we just
included papers in the past 10 years. The classification of our
solutions is based on the research categories from those papers
we reviewed and attacks on the intelligent vehicle systems.
This review paper classifies the main current defence mech-
anisms to cryptography, network security, software vulnerabil-
ity detection, and malware detection. Moreover, we propose
new research directions in these four defence categories: Light-
weight authentication (cryptography), 3GPP and software de-
fined security (network security), deep learning (software
vulnerability and malware detection). The major motivation
that led us to carry out this work is the ever-expanding gap
between security attacks and existing safety measures.
The key structures of the technical content in the survey
paper is illustrated in Figure 1. It taxonomizes the security of
intelligent vehicles according to the following attributes: (i)
Intelligent Vehicle System Architecture: makes an overview
on the Electronic/Electrical architecture of intelligent vehicle
systems and presents an overall view of Electronic/Electrical
architecture as well as the in-vehicle communication network,
computation platform, and new sensors in intelligent vehicles.
(ii) Security Requirements and Identified Attacks: discusses
security requirements for vehicular systems in four cate-
gories (authentication, integrity, privacy, and availability) and
presents a classification of attacks on vehicles and vehicular
networks including denial-of-service attacks, distributed denial
of service attacks, black-hole attacks, replay attacks, Sybil
attacks, impersonation attacks, and also more identified attacks
Fig. 1. Key structures of our technical contribution
on components of intelligent vehicles (iii) Defences against
the attacks: refers to the list of existing novel techniques
including cryptography, signature-based detection, anomaly-
based detection, software vulnerability detection, and malware
detection which can be used to deal with security challenges in
automotive systems. (iv) Future Directions: shows the possible
areas (e.g. lightweight authentication, software defined secu-
rity, deep learning) for further studies. Future research should,
therefore, concentrate on the investigation of these solutions.
This study makes the following contributions:
• Detailed description of the intelligent vehicle system
• Explaining attacks associated with the intelligent vehicle
system
• Defences against the attacks and possible research direc-
tion
In particular, this review paper aimed to examine four
research questions:
• What is the state of the art of vehicle systems?
• What are unique research challenges in securing vehicle
systems?
• What are the main solutions and their pros and cons?
• And what are promising solutions to improve security?
The remainder of this paper has been divided into four sec-
tions: Section II gives an overall review of the state-of-the-art
intelligent vehicle systems architecture. Section III discusses
security attacks experienced and challenges currently faced by
intelligent vehicle systems. In Section IV we highlight the best
practices to deal with these security challenges in intelligent
vehicle systems. Section V discusses some promising future
3Fig. 2. Gateway-based E/E architecture
directions to address those security challenges in intelligent
vehicle systems. Limitations and threats to the validity of
this study are discussed in Section VI. Finally, Section VII
summarises our findings.
II. INTELLIGENT VEHICLE SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
The series production of high-level intelligent connected
vehicle (ICV) is an active research topic in the automotive
industry. Many intelligent driving functionalities have been
installed on passenger cars, such as lane keeping assistance
(LKA), lane departure warning (LDW) and other assistance
systems. It is sure that the high-level intelligent vehicle should
be able to accomplish all these functionalities. However, it
is not feasible to integrate all these intelligent assistance
systems by simply put them together, as the traditional Elec-
trical/Electronic Architecture (EEA) was not designed for
supporting so many intelligent functionalities. Especially, the
required abilities of data acquisition and processing are beyond
the limit of traditional EEA. The next-generation EEA which
could support the high-level ICV is the key to ICV’s series
production. The next-generation EEA needs fundamental ad-
vancement in three parts, which is the overall structure design,
the in-vehicle/ inter-vehicle communication network, and the
computation platform.
A. The Overall E/E Architecture of Intelligent Vehicle
The topology design of overall architecture is fundamen-
tal to improve the performance of EEA. The main task of
topology design is to ensure the data flow on the network
matches the need of each node. As shown in Figure 2, the
traditional EEA topology is based on the controller area
network (CAN). Due to the characteristics of CAN, every node
in the network must share the bandwidth with each other. The
bandwidth is like a bottleneck that limits the data processing
ability of each ECU on the network. The core problem of
traditional EEA is the lack of space for high computation
power unit, which is necessary for intelligent driving. The
topology of next-generation EEA should specify where the
complex computation is realized and how the huge amount of
data is transferred.
One feasible approach is the domain-based topology which
has been recently applied in production vehicles. Its concept is
to divide the autonomous driving system into several domains.
Its main difference with the traditional EEA is the occurrence
Fig. 3. Domain-based E/E architecture
Fig. 4. Centralized E/E Architecture
of domain ECU, which is the core computation platform of
each domain. The vehicle components can be classified into
different domains according to their functionalities. Usually,
the sensors and actuators those can be shared by different
functionalities would be grouped as one domain. For example,
the commonly used domains are the infotainment domain,
the chassis and safety domain. The domain-based EEA can
be illustrated by Figure 3. The domain-based topology has
advantages over the traditional one. First of all, it can support
more complex intelligent driving functions, as each domain
ECU has more power in both communication and computation.
The domain ECU can be directly connected to sensors in
the domain without the problem of sharing bandwidth. It
is also a computation platform to integrate related simple
control functions into a complex behavior control function
[12]. Furthermore, the distributed computation strategy of
domain-based topology has the advantage of being more
compatible with traditional EEA system. The domains can
be relatively independent to each other, while only transmit
necessary information to other domains. The data flow within
the domain will not occupy the bandwidth and other resources
of the backbone.
The centralized architecture is another approach for the EEA
of the next generation. In a centralized architecture, most of
the computation tasks are realized in the central computation
entity, as illustrated in Figure 4, rather than distributed in
different functional domains. Most of the components should
be connected to the central computation entity, which could
access all sensors and actuators. The benefit of a centralized
topology is the ability of realizing complete sensor fusion. In
theory, when the central computation entity could combine
4more information, it has the potentials to make a better
decision and execute better behavior. However, a centralized
topology has higher demands on the data communication
capacity. The centralized EEA needs to group the components
into different sub-networks according to their physical place-
ment or the network properties to improve the efficiency of
communication. The controller of the sub-network is called a
zone controller in [13].
B. The In-Vehicle Communication Network of Intelligent Ve-
hicles
As mentioned above, one of the most significant challenges
for the next-generation EEA is managing the high-speed
communication among a vehicle’s electronic components with
a limited cost. The most successful communication network in
the current automotive industry is the controller area network
(CAN) protocol. The CAN protocol is developed by BOSCH
and it has been the most widely used standard in the field
of vehicle hardware communication since its publication in
1986 [14]. Compared to other network technologies, CAN has
two outstanding advantages: cost efficiency and flexibility. A
variant of CAN is CAN with flexible data rate (CAN-FD)
[15], [16] with a bandwidth of up to 8 Mb/s [17]. CAN is
a multi-master network in which every node could equally
and independently receive and broadcast information. With
this characteristic, CAN is almost a plug-and-play system:
new ECUs or diagnostic tools can be easily connected to the
network without special modification of the network. Never-
theless, it also makes the communication system vulnerable to
attacks.
In many subsystems of vehicles, different kinds of spe-
cialized communication networks are developed for specific
automotive applications. Each of these networks has its own
advantages and will possibly still exist in the vehicle for
a long time, but they are unlikely to be employed as the
backbone communication network in the EEA of the next
generation. A LIN (Local Interconnect Network) permits a
low-cost and flexible wire harness, and can be easily imple-
mented without special support requirements. however, the
bandwidth capacity of LIN is only 20 kb/s. It is usually used in
the switches and motors that roll windows and control seats.
FlexRay protocol was designed to support the use of fully
electric/electronic systems for performing vehicle’s safety-
critical functions including “brake-by-wire”, “suspension-by-
wire”, “steer-by-wire”, and in general “x-by wire” [18]. With
a built-in mechanism of time synchronization, FlexRay can
ensure real-time communication between safety-critical com-
ponents with little time delay. Media Oriented Serial Transport
(MOST) is another in-vehicle network. MOST was developed
to support infotainment devices and related applications in
vehicles [19], [20], [21]. It employs plastic optical fibers as
its physical layer, so the network is isolated from EMI (Elec-
tro Magnetic Interference), preventing problems like buzzing
sounds in the infotainment system.
A promising candidate for the backbone communication
network is the automotive ethernet [22], [23], [24]. Though
ethernet is not a new idea for data communication, it still needs
TABLE I
SPECIFICATIONS OF COMMON VEHICLE BUSES [25]
a great amount of modification and research to be utilized by
vehicles. It was until 2013 that the first application of AE
appeared in production vehicles, when the BMW X5 used
AE for connection of the onboard cameras. The comparison
between AE and other networks is shown in Table I. The
main advantages of AE are as follows: (1) Larger bandwidth.
Currently, the bandwidth capacity of the AE protocol is 100
Mbps and in the near future, it will be increased to 1 Gbps. (2)
Improved security. An IP-based routing method is employed
by the Ethernet, thus it prevents one compromised ECU
to perform malicious attacks on the whole communication
system. Moreover, the switches in ethernet can manage the
information flow in the network, and avoid hi-jacked ECUs
flooding overload data into the network.
The emergence of various wireless communication tech-
nologies enables the development of cooperative communica-
tion. In particular, the breakthrough of 4G LTE and 5G remote
communication technologies, and the development of DSRC
(Dedicated Short Range Communications) supported V2X
communications. The next important step was accident-free
driving based on inter-vehicle communications and Coopera-
tive ITS (Intelligent Transportation Systems) [26]. Cooperative
perception-based V2X provides an exciting opportunity for
developing more reliable target recognition and tracking in
the field of view (FOV) [27]. Furthermore, it can also provide
an accurate perception of occluded objects [28], [29], [30]
or objects outside the FOV by multimodal sensor data fusion
[31], [32], [25].
C. The Computation Platform for Intelligent Vehicle
Traditionally, simple controllers such as MCUs and DSPs
were well established in vehicles for data processing of various
functions including taillights on and off [33], air-conditioning
[34], powertrain [35], etc. Meanwhile, DSPs can execute more
complicated applications, like onboard multimedia systems
[36] and driver assistance functions [37], [38] which require
high integration and great processing capacity.
5In high-level ICV, more than hundreds of millions of lines
of code are expected to be executed by the processors to
realize intelligent algorithms including sensor fusion and deep
learning. Therefore, a powerful computation platform with
better hardware and software design is urgently needed. Both
GPU and FPGA are believed to have wide application in the
automotive industry in near future. A GPU is specialized in
massively parallel computation, and thus it is very good at
image processing [39], which makes it ideal in self-driving
vehicles for computational complex systems such as obstacle
detection system and collision avoidance system. Another
option is Field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) which
are suitable for parallel computing and have less energy
consumption.
The software system is another indispensable task of a
computation platform. The software used in the automotive
industry has its own requirements. OSEK/VDX is a joint
project that is developed by the European automotive industry.
The aim of this project is to develop a real-time operating
system for automotive applications [40]. Another important
project is JASPAR (Japan Automotive Software Platform and
ARchitecture) established in 2004 by Japan, and well-known
corporations including Toyota, Nissan, and Honda are among
its member companies. It should be mentioned that one major
drawback of OSEK/VDX and JASPAR is that they fail to take
the reusability and transferability demanded by the modern
automotive electronics industry into account. The AUTOSAR
(AUTO-motive Open System ARchitecture) standard is de-
veloped to separate application software from the associated
hardware, and thus save development costs [41]. However,
AUTOSAR still needs further development to support com-
plicated perception algorithms and AI applications.
Although general operating systems such as Linux and
Android support highly complex algorithms, the major prob-
lem is that they cannot be used as the automotive embedded
software. It is necessary to develop a software platform com-
bining the advantages of both an automotive software system
and a general operating system [42]. Currently, AUTOSAR
as a global partnership for developing automotive software
is standardizing AUTOSAR adaptive platform. In particular,
providing a stable programming interface as well as supporting
Ethernet-based E/E architectures are the two major objectives
of this software platform [43]. In software development,
software update and security are two primary concerns. For
an autonomous driving vehicle, it is necessary to update its
software even after it has been sold, just like a smartphone.
Update through over-the-air can bring lots of convenience and
benefits to both consumers and manufacturers. The security
during updates is quite important and is becoming a hot
research topic [44].
D. New Sensors in Intelligent Vehicles
In order to achieve full observations of both the vehicle’s
own state, the surroundings and even the situation beyond
the visual range, the intelligent vehicle needs to be equipped
with many new sensors. By comparing the sensors used in
autonomous driving competitions [45], [46], [47], [48], [49] as
Fig. 5. Mainstream sensors used in autonomous driving competitions and
projects
shown in Figure 5, we can see the current trends in perception
technology. The fusion of multi-sensors is widely accepted
as an essential method to ensure perception robustness. The
sensor fusion for high-level ICV mainly refers to the following
sensors: LiDAR, Radar and intelligent cameras.
• LiDAR: LiDAR which stands for Light Detection and
Ranging enables self-driving cars to observe the world.
In fact, it is achieved by utilizing laser light pulses. High-
definition LiDAR provides a 360-degree field of view
with more than 16 laser channels. Regarding rotation
mechanisms, LiDAR may be classified into three main
categories: mechanical LiDAR, semisolid-state LiDAR,
and solid-state LiDAR.
• Radar: Millimeter-wave radar is capable of penetrating
nontransparent materials such as smoke, dust, snow, and
fog. In other words, the main advantage of Millimeter-
wave radar is its capability to handle small size, all-
weather, and long detection distance. However, low hor-
izontal resolution and low lateral detection accuracy are
the most significant limitations of Millimeter-ware radars
[50], [51]. Due to these shortcomings, the fusion of
Millimeter-wave radars with other sensors with the aim
of increasing the accuracy of object perception system is
required. One solution is the fusion of Millimeter-wave
radar and Monocular camera [52], [53], [54].
• Intelligent visual sensors: A monocular visual system
and stereo vision system are the main intelligent visual
sensors in intelligent vehicles. They are utilized in order
to achieve semantic segmentation of the driving environ-
ment [50], target detection and tracking [55], ranging
[56], [57], driver distraction and fatigue detection [58],
and so on [59], [60]. AI technology, such as deep learning,
is deeply integrated into the visual sensors to provide
more accurate detection results. However, visual sensors
are unstable in changing light conditions. What is worse,
the AI algorithm can be attacked leading, to a false
detection result.
6III. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS AND IDENTIFIED ATTACKS
In recent years we have seen an increased amount of
research related to vehicular networks, and fully automated
vehicles are fast becoming a reality. They have a tremendous
potential to increase efficiency and safety for their occupants
and they have already been implemented in trials in a number
of locations around the United States and throughout Europe
[61], [62]. Understandably, as with any new technology, there
is a certain amount of hesitation regarding self-driving ve-
hicles; this has been further enhanced by recent incidents
in California and Arizona in the United States [63], [64]
where self-driving vehicles have been involved in incidents
with pedestrians. This has prompted a number of companies
like Uber to slow down or suspend the deployment of self-
driving vehicles [65], in an attempt to optimize operation
and restore public confidence. In addition to unpredictable
accidents, VANETs are susceptible to a number of malicious
attacks and intrusions, where users are going to cause damage
to intentionally the vehicle or its occupants.
VANETs’ dynamic nature and their need for real-time
communications mean that attacks are particularly effective
and often have detrimental effects. Consequently, awareness
of potential threats and developing mitigation methods to
proactively mitigate attacks is required. A wide range of
attacks on intelligent vehicle systems have been discovered
in recent years. This is in addition to the existing attacks that
occur in traditional networks. As a matter of fact, cybersecurity
has been a growing area of concern for many governments and
corporations around the world and, as we become increasingly
dependent on technology, cybersecurity becomes a central
issue in the design stage. Since VANETs are envisioned
to operate, at least in part, over existing architecture, the
taxonomy of attacks that VANETs face becomes extensive.
In 2016 a group of Chinese security researchers from Keen
Security Lab discovered a method to hack a Tesla controller
area network (CAN) bus, which can be found in almost all
intelligent cars and controls indicators and brakes [66]. They
were able to remotely access the central control unit and
adjust the mirrors, lock the doors, manipulate the dashboard
and even apply the brakes. This was reported to Tesla who
quickly provided an update for its vehicles. However, this
event clearly revealed that there is a real issue with outdated
software being used. Recently, another team from Keen Se-
curity Lab discovered 14 vulnerabilities in BMW cars [67].
They discovered that they were able to use a backdoor to gain
access to the telematics control unit as well as the CAN bus.
Similar to Tesla, BMW’s response was to roll out upgrades
for the affected models. These were made available over an
air connection or for customers at the BMW dealerships.
Similarly, researchers in the Netherlands discovered a method
to get around RFID-based key immobilizers [68], which have
been used as a primary security feature by many automotive
manufacturers since 1996. The authors in [68] used a method
that bypasses the cryptographic authentication, while it can
be conducted in less than six minutes with no specialized
hardware.
The next section discusses some system level requirements
for vehicular networks. The subsequent section details the
various types of attacks that intelligent vehicles are susceptible
to.
A. Security Requirements
Successful, safe and secure implementation of intelligent
vehicular systems is dependent on designing and developing
an extensive security framework. Therefore, vehicular systems
must abide by strict security requirements. Identification of
appropriate security requirements in the early stages of con-
ceptual design and development plays a key role in ensuring
that vehicles and occupants will remain safe and secure at
all times. Throughout the literature, authentication, integrity,
privacy, and availability are among the most significant prereq-
uisites needing to be provided by a security system [69]. In this
section, we discuss these four categories as key requirements
for successful and secure integration of vehicular systems.
Studying security requirements will provide deep knowledge
of security attacks, security vulnerabilities, and security de-
fences.
1) Authentication: Authentication is one of the key security
requirements of any communication systems. In fact, it is a
requirement for verifying the identity of participants in a com-
munication and protecting sensitive information and critical
data by preventing all unauthorized access [70]. Authentication
in vehicular systems is an important attribute that needs to be
considered carefully in the early stages of system design and
implementation. It means that data/information can only be
accessed by authorized users. In essence, only the intended
parties should be able to have access to the message and
retrieve its original contents. To fulfill the authentication re-
quirement, it is essential that key management and distribution
be efficient and accurate.
2) Integrity: The integrity of a communication system
refers to the validity of data between the sender and the
receiver. The primary requirement of integrity within a com-
munication system is that the received data is accurate and
is not altered maliciously [70]. In vehicular networks, it is
essential to be able to validate that the message has not been
corrupted during transmission by degradation factors such as
noise and fading, as well as deliberately by an attacker. To
achieve this goal, error detection and correction codes must
be implemented.
3) Privacy: In the Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle-
to-Infrastructure (V2I) modes of communication, where vehi-
cles employ different techniques for sharing information (e.g.
information about their geographical location) and creating a
cooperation-oriented environment among vehicles and RSUs,
the shared information can be used maliciously to track
users [71]. Hence, privacy is another significant challenge in
intelligent vehicle systems, and sensitive information must be
protected by intelligent cars [11].
4) Availability: In vehicular networks, improving the
chance of getting information by all targeted vehicles is
of great importance. VANETs are highly dynamic and the
network must be able to respond in real time. Continuous
availability is difficult to achieve in normal operating con-
ditions and it becomes even harder when we consider that
7updates and patches will also have to be used at some stages.
Thus, it is important that replication is considered in the
early stages of design for increasing content availability and
decreasing delivery cost. When there is a fault or temporary
outage in one part of the network, it is important that network
operations continue and that the vehicles be unaware of any
problems. It is essential that services be available at all times.
Consequently, the required redundancy for this purpose must
be implemented properly [72].
B. Security Attacks
In addition to the requirements described above, in order for
vehicles to be securely and successfully deployed they must
be dynamic and responsive to threats. Threats to security must
be mitigated whenever possible; in other words, a proactive
approach to threats should be a key requirement that must be
met. However, since it is impossible to predict all possible
threats to the network, reactive approaches must be effective
and deployed quickly and efficiently. It is important that
users experience as little disruption as possible as a result of
an attack. The following sections present a classification of
attacks that affect vehicles.
1) Denial of Service Attacks (DoS): Denial-of-service-
attacks (DoS) are well known and have been used extensively
to disrupt network operations for many years. Denial-of-
service-attacks involve flooding a host with an enormous
amount of information in an attempt to overload it, effectively
preventing it from receiving or processing information coming
in from legitimate users. Denial-of-service-attacks are very
effective at disrupting networks’ operations, but they are
computationally expensive to execute. As such DoS attacks
have evolved over the years. DoS attacks have been optimised
by targeting specific nodes that are seen as core elements
on the network. In addition, common control channels have
also been identified as key targets. If an attacker takes out
the common control channel in the network, it essentially
takes out the method of communication between users. This
is an optimum strategy that allows for maximum results
with minimum effort. In VANETs, the primary target for
attackers would be the road-side unit (RSU). RSUs are a
core component in VANETs as they authenticate, manage and
update users and their information. Therefore, a successful
attack on an RSU can have a detrimental effect on network
operations. The simplest method to combat denial of service
attacks is to block the attacker’s IP address.
2) Distributed Denial-of-service-attacks (DDoS): In tradi-
tional denial-of-service-attacks, a single attacker attacks a node
or a channel using a single IP address, usually from a single
computer. This often places a huge burden on the attacker’s
resources. As a result, attackers often use multiple IP addresses
in a distributed attack, reducing the resource burden. Often
an attacker will plant Trojans in unsuspecting users and use
their resources to perform DDoS attacks. Distributed DoS
attacks are even harder to mitigate and combat because the
incoming messages can come from a large number of users.
Therefore, it becomes useless to simply block a single IP
address. It becomes difficult to distinguish between attackers
and legitimate users that have been infected. Similar to a DoS
attack, distributed DoS attacks can be performed on both RSUs
and other vehicles on the network.
3) Black-Hole Attacks: Black-hole attacks are common in
communication systems. In a black-hole attack, an attacker
instead of forwarding packets to their destination drops them,
creating a hole where no packets are able to move through
the network. This type of attack can have serious implications
on network performance and routing. If an attacker is in a
critical path between two groups of users, where no other paths
exist, a black-hole attack effectively means that the two groups
are not able to communicate with each other and become
isolated. Black-hole attacks can be mitigated in a number
of ways. One way is to introduce reputation-based routing,
where paths that are chosen have a reputation associated with
them. If the path does not deliver the packets the reputation
is decreased and a path with the highest reputation is used.
Deep learning and machine learning can also be implemented
in networks to accurately predict which paths are going to
be safe. These methods all require additional overhead on the
network. A variant of a black-hole attack is called a grey-
hole attack. In a grey-hole attack, the attacker only drops a
percentage of packets. Attackers do this in order to avoid
detection. This makes it difficult for mitigation methods to
distinguish between dropping packets on purpose and packets
that are dropped or corrupted during transmission even when
all users on the network are legitimate.
4) Replay Attacks: Replay attacks are somewhat related
to black-hole attacks. However, in black-hole attacks the
sender intentionally sends out packets through the attacker,
thinking they are legitimate, and will relay the packets to
their destination. In a replay attack, the sender does not know
that there is a node in the middle intercepting packs [73].
Replay attacks are a variant of man-in-the-middle attacks.
In man-in-the-middle attacks, the attacker sits between the
receiver and the transmitter and intercepts packets as they
are transmitted. Unlike in a black-hole attack (where packets
are dropped) packets are quickly retransmitted making it
appear as though nothing happened. In a replay attack, the
attacker captures packets on their way to the destination and
manipulates them to attack the network. In a classic scenario,
an attacker intercepts a message with a password attached to it,
later using the same password to authenticate themselves and
impersonate a node. In VANETs, replay attacks often target
communication between the vehicle and the road-side unit
(RSU). If an attacker intercepts a message between an RSU
and a vehicle which contains the encryption key or password
they would be able to authenticate themselves at a later time.
Man-in-the-middle and replay attacks are difficult to mitigate
effectively because it is almost impossible to know when you
are under attack. Since in most cases attackers are highly
mobile and do not alter the packets in any way. Mitigation
methods consist of the implementation of a strong encryption
method, using virtual private networks and using time-delay
variation.
5) Sybil Attacks: Sybil attacks, or pseudospoofing attacks
as they are sometimes known, involve a user creating a large
number of pseudonymous identities [74], [75]. Traditionally,
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the large number of users allows the attacker to have a
greater influence on the network. In cases where resources
are equally distributed, a Sybil attack would allow the user to
have access to a large portion of the overall resources. In 2014
an attack on TOR (a peer-to-peer sharing site) was detected
where a group of users flooded the TOR network for several
months [76]. In VANETs Sybil attacks can be used with a
similar intention. However, Sybil attacks can also be used
to route traffic in a certain direction, for example, when an
attacker creates a large number of pseudonymous identities
at certain locations. The increase in the number of users at a
certain location indicates that there is severe congestion at that
location which would force other vehicles to change their own
routing to avoid the congested area. In VANETs, when Sybil
attacks are performed with the assistance of global positioning
systems (GPS) spoofing attacks (where an attacker attempts
to appear to be at a location where they are not) would allow
the attacker to ensure that they have a congestion-free route.
A congestion-free route would be created because all other
vehicles would attempt to route around problem areas. In peer-
to-peer networks, this type of attack is difficult to mitigate
since peer-to-peer networks rely heavily on the anonymity of
users. The most effective mitigation methods are identification
and authentication based methods using cryptology or public
encryption.
6) Impersonation Attacks: Impersonation-based attacks are
common in many real-life scenarios. The simplest example of
an impersonation is when one person pretends to be another
to gain an advantage (monetary or material) or conceal their
real identity. In communication systems, users are motivated
by similar reasons. Impersonation attacks can be used to
gain access to resources or classified information that has
restricted access. In this scenario users often have access to
login details and passwords of authorised parties, which they
use to impersonate authorised users. Impersonation attacks are
therefore often a result of man-in-the-middle attacks, where
users intercept packets travelling through the network. This is
sometimes described as a phishing attack, since users often
intercept random packets looking for one with authentication
information (much like what one would do while fishing). In
VANETs malicious nodes would impersonate road-side units
in an attempt to trick users into divulging their authentication
details. After authentication information has been acquired
it can be used to access classified information or even as
authentication with other parties. Attackers could also imper-
sonate other vehicles to gain an advantage. For example, as an
attacker might choose to impersonate an emergency vehicle,
that would give them a higher priority within the network
and would lead to less congestion. A number of methods
have been proposed to mitigate against impersonation attacks
in communication systems. Methods based on encryption,
localization, and clustering can be used to mitigate the effects
of impersonation attacks.
7) Malware: Malware and spyware have been designed
around since the early days of the internet. Malicious nodes
insert specialized malicious software (malware) within legiti-
mate software. When a user downloads and installs the soft-
ware they unknowingly also install malware on their system.
Malware often refers to a number of malicious software agents
such as Spyware, Adware, and Trojans. The primary goal of
Malware software is to collect information on the host, often
looking for bank-account details or confidential information.
Another common method that attackers use to infect machines
is through false updates. Bogus update requires are sent to
users that intentionally introduce malware in their system.
Indeed, malware has great detrimental effects on VANETs.
Since VANET networks are highly dynamic and will be
changed and updated often, vehicles must ensure that updates
and information that they are receiving coming from a trusted
source. If it is not, and they become infected, they are at a
risk of losing personal information and in some cases having
critical malfunctions. The simplest method for mitigation of
Malware attacks is the introduction of a firewall which is able
to filter malicious messages from legitimate ones. However,
additional methods are sometimes needed, as attacks have
been known to find methods around firewalls [77]. In addition
to firewall protection, reputation-based schemes are often
introduced to ensure that only messages from trusted parties
are accepted.
8) Falsified-Information Attack: The spreading of falsified
information is again commonly used in communication sys-
tems. A Sybil can be seen as an example of a falsified-
information attack. In a similar way, attackers can spread
falsified information about the congestion on roads to effec-
tively force other drivers to diverge to alternate routes. They
can also create congestion by neglecting to report congestion
or accidents on the road. This form of attack is commonly
used because it is computationally inexpensive and can have
a high impact because of the distributed nature of VANETs.
If an attacker is able to convince a single vehicle, that vehicle
would unknowingly become an attacker as it would propagate
falsified information to the next vehicle. This form of attack
is often combated using reputation-based schemes that reward
drivers that send out legitimate information and punish drivers
that send out falsified information.
9) Timing Attacks: Time synchronization is a key aspect in
VANETs. Vehicles move in and out of networks very rapidly
which introduces the need for real-time updates and informa-
tion exchange between both RSUs and vehicles. Since time-
critical message exchange is critical, any delay in messages
can cause serious problems. Timing attacks are similar in
many ways to black and grey hole attacks. However, instead of
dropping all or a portion of the packets a malicious node adds
a time slot to introduce intentional delay. This causes major
issues, especially in autonomous vehicles where a delay in
time-sensitive information can cause a major accident.
C. Aligning the Attacks with Intelligent Vehicle System Archi-
tecture
This part of the paper aligns above-mentioned attacks
with different components of the intelligent vehicle system
architecture identified in Section II. Table II lists security at-
tacks on different components in intelligent vehicles including
overall E/E architecture, communication network, computation
9platform, and new sensors. An intelligent vehicle with its
components is shown in Figure 6. Below, we demonstrate the
identified attacks on these components.
• Overall E/E architecture: As mentioned earlier, the in-
vehicle networks (CAN, LIN, FlexRay, and MOST) are
vulnerable to different cybersecurity attacks. Through an
on-board diagnostics (ODB) port or a USB port attackers
can stop the engine or brakes of a vehicle and cause
a fatal car crash [78]. Replay attack and impersonation
attack on CAN bus are reported in [79]. Nilsson et al.
[80] simulated spoofing (Sybil) attack on the FlexRay bus
by creating and injecting diagnostic messages. Another
instance is the E/E architecture of Electrical Vehicle (EV).
In recent years, the use of EVs, that can be recharged from
an external source of electricity, has been dramatically
increased. The architecture of EV charging-station sys-
tems makes it possible for information exchange between
EV and electrical vehicle supply equipment (EVSV) that
may be used for payment systems for public charging
stations. Consequently, EVs are subject to cybersecurity
attacks by the charging-plug interface. The International
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) has defined the com-
munication protocol between a charging station and an
EV by the ICE 61851 and ISO 15118 standards [81].
• Communication network: Wi-Fi, WiMAX, Long-Term
Evolution (LTE), Near-Field Communication (NFC), and
Dedicated Short-Range Communications (DSRC) are
among the available communication standards and tech-
nologies for Vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle-to-
infrastructure (V2I) data communications. Vehicle-to-
everything (V2X) or inter-vehicle communications are
wireless, and security is considered one of the most
significant challenges of V2X technology [82]. Moreover,
audio and video players, automotive navigation systems,
USB and Bluetooth connectivity, carputers, audio control,
hands-free voice control and in general infotainment
systems have increased security concerns about potential
remote car hacking. In reviewing the literature, Sybil
attack [83], black-hole attack [84], Dos attack, DDoS
attack, replay attack, and timing attack [85] on the com-
munication network of intelligent vehicle systems were
found. In additions, V2V communications are susceptible
to malware attack [86].
• Computational platform: Malware can penetrate into
the software systems of intelligent vehicles. Additionally,
DoS attacks can be launched in order to disrupt process-
ing ability of a vehicle [87].
• New sensors: The tire-pressure monitoring system is a
warning system for measuring the air pressure of tires by
pressure sensors or monitoring individual wheel rotational
speeds and warning the driver when tires are under-
inflated. A TMPS notifies the driver when a vehicle’s tire
pressure is low. Under those circumstances, a security
issue related to TPMS is that a vehicle may be tracked
using existing sensors along the roadways [87]. Another
instance is Remote Keyless System (RKS) or smart
key that is most widely used as electronic authoriza-
Fig. 6. Typical components of intelligent vehicles
tion system in order to controls access to the vehicle.
Sensors in the vehicle are able to sense the received
signal from the remote key. Along with this growth in
using smart keys, however, there is increasing concern
over their security vulnerabilities. The most compelling
evidence is a surveillance video released by West Mid-
land police department in Birmingham, England in 2017
that shows two hackers exploiting keyless technology to
steal a Mercedes-Benz [88]. Besides, In [89] a falsified-
information attack on LiDAR system of a vehicle is
reported.
All the aforementioned requirements and attacks lead to the
conclusion that securing intelligent vehicles is of great impor-
tance. Thus, security solutions, mechanisms, and techniques
should be used to deal with these attacks. In the next section,
we will present some key findings and our analysis.
IV. EXISTING DEFENCES AGAINST THE ATTACKS
In this section, we walk through a variety of existing
defences (Figure7) which can be used as best practices to deal
with the security attacks identified in Section III, and analyze
the pros and cons of these defences. Table III lists all security
defences presented in this section and associates them with
security requirements and security attacks.
A. Cryptography
This section provides an overview of cryptography-based
algorithms used to enhance security for vehicular networks.
Encryption has been used by humans long before computer
systems to hide messages from unwanted parties. As computer
networks have developed encryption has become an essential
part in ensuring that the integrity of information remains intact.
In intelligent vehicular systems, encryption is an essential
key to ensure safety. The section that follows outlines a
number of existing security algorithms based on symmetric
key encryption, asymmetric key encryption, and attribute-
based encryption.
1) Symmetric Encryption: Symmetric-key cryptography is
used in a wide range of applications. In symmetric-key cryp-
tology, a single key is used both to encrypt and decrypt data,
as shown in Figure 8. It is known to be less secure than
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TABLE II
SECURITY ATTACKS ON COMPONENTS OF INTELLIGENT VEHICLES
DoS DDoS Black-Hole Replay Sybil Impersonation Malware Falsified-Information Timing
Overall E/E architecture X X X
Communication network X X X X X X X
Computation platform X X
New sensors X X
Defences
Cryptography
Symmetric Encryption [90] [66] [91] [92] [93] [94] [95]
Asymmetric Encryption [96] [97] [98] [99] [100] [101]
Attribute-based Encryption [102] [103] [104] [105]
Network Security
Signature-based Detection [106] [107]
Anomaly-based Detection [108] [109] [110] [111] [83] [112] [113] [84] [79] [114]
Software Vulnerability Detection
Static Analysis [115] [116] [117] [118] [119]
Dynamic Analysis [120] [121] [122]
Software Testing [123]
Machine Learning [124] [125] [126] [127] [128]
Malware Detection [129] [130] [131] [132]
Fig. 7. Existing defences against the attacks
asymmetric cryptography, which uses one key for encryption
and another, separate, key for decryption. In symmetric-key
encryption, it is essential that a secure channel is established
so that keys can be exchanged safely. If this channel is
compromised or the key is mistakenly shared with the at-
tacker, that attacker would have full access to the network.
Traditionally, Symmetric keys were seldom used in point-to-
point communication. They were primarily used in retrieval
situations, where data is stored in a database at a central
location. However, they gained popularity because they are
simple, and much faster than asymmetric. The number of keys
needed for symmetric encryption is far less. This is primarily
because that they use a single key and they usually have
smaller key sizes, which significantly reduces overhead.
In [90] a decentralized method is proposed to authenticate
vehicles using hash functions. The Two-Factor Lightweight
Privacy preserving (2FLIP) algorithm works in two steps to
provide fast and accurate authentication. In the first step, a
thematic device is used to identify the driver using fingerprints
or face recognition. The key strength of using biological pass-
word is nonrepudiation. In other words, driving evidence or
sent messages are undeniable. This is denoted as a biological
password and is needed along with the certificate authority
(CA), for user authentication. The second step is decentraliza-
tion of the CA, which means that constant transmission of the
CA is not needed, increasing overall efficiency. The authors
propose that the new method presents a large improvement
in terms of computational complexity as opposed to existing
Fig. 8. Symmetric encryption
schemes. The results of performance evaluation indicate that in
2FLIP, computation cost has been reduced 100-1000 times and
communication overhead has been decreased between 55%
and 77%. The reduction in overhead makes this method highly
practical. A disadvantage of this algorithm is that all new
drivers would have to be subjected to an authentication phase
to add them to the list of authenticated drivers.
A broadcast authentication protocol called the Timed Ef-
ficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication (TESLA) is pro-
posed in [66]. In the TESLA scheme, a user sends out packets
encrypted with a public key. Initially, the receiver is not able to
authenticate the packets. The packet is put into a buffer and the
receiver waits for the next packet to authenticate the current
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TABLE III
COMPARISON OF SECURITY DEFENCES BASED ON SECURITY ATTACKS AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
Category Security solutions main mitigated attacks Authentication Integrity Privacy Availability
C
ry
pt
og
ra
ph
y
2FLIP [90] DoS X X X Medium
TESLA [66] DoS, packet injection X X X Medium
RAISE [91] Impersonation X X X Medium
PACP [92] Eavesdropping, replay, impersonation X X Medium
ECDSA [93] All malicious attacks X Medium
SA-KMP [94] DoS, replay, impersonation X X X Medium
GKMPAN [95] Eavesdropping, replay X Limited
PPAA [96] Sybil X X N/A
Calandriello et al. [97] DoS, jamming X X X Limited
PPGCV [98] Collusion X X Limited
TACKs [99] Eavesdropping, Sybil, correlation X X Limited
GSIS [100] DoS X X X Limited
SRAAC [101] Unauthorized access X Limited
DABE [102] Collusion X Limited
ABACS [103] Collusion X Limited
Xia et al. [104] Collusion, replay X X Limited
Bouabdellah et al. [105] Black-hole X Limited
N
et
w
or
k
Se
cu
ri
ty
Bißmeyer et al. [106] Sybil X X X Medium
REST-Net [107] Impersonation, falsified information X X N/A
CIDS [108] DoS, masquarade X Limited
Martynov et al. [109] DoS Good
IDFV [110] Selective forwarding, black-hole Medium
Song et al. [111] Message injection N/A
Zaidi et al. [83] Sybil, falsified information X Good
OTIDS [112] DoS, impersonation, fuzzy N/A
PES [113] Sybil X X Medium
AECFV [84] Black-hole, worme hole, Sybil X X Limited
Markovitz et al. [79] Falsified information Meduim
PML-CIDS [114] DoS, probing, unauthorized access X Medium
So
ft
w
ar
e
V
ul
ne
ra
bi
lit
y
D
et
ec
tio
n
Tice et al. [115] Control-flow X X Good
Dahse and Holz [116] XSS, remote code execution X X Good
PITTYPAT [117] Control-flow X X X Good
DFI [118] Buffer overflow X X X Good
FindBugs [119] Buffer overflow X Medium
Generational Search [120] Malware (Bug) X X N/A
TaintCheck [121] Overwrite X X X Medium
Dytan [122] Control-flow, data-flow, overwrte X X Good
GenProg [123] DoS, overflow X X Medium
Shin et al. [124] Malware (Bug) X X Good
Perl et al. [125] Malware (Bug) X X Good
Zhou and Sharma [126] DoS X X Good
Shar et al. [127] Injection, file inclusion X X Good
VDiscover [128] Malware X X Good
M
al
w
ar
e
D
et
ec
tio
n
MSPMD [129] Malware X X Limited
MRMR-SVMS [130] Malware X X X Limited
Huda et al. [131] Malware X X N/A
CloudIntell [132] Malware X X Variable
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packet. The next packet is sent along with the key for the
previous packet. The receiver is able to authenticate the first
packet. If the authentication is successful the packet is kept
and if not it is discarded. Packets are kept, until they are all
authenticated. TESLA uses one-way hash functions and loose
time synchronization between the sender and the receiver.
Time synchronization does not have to be accurate as long as
the receiver has an idea of the upper bound of the time it takes
for the packet to reach them. In the TESLA method packets
are split up and the key for the current packet is attached to the
next packet. The receiver is only able to authenticate a packet
after it has received the next packet. One of the disadvantages
of this method is that, with a high volume of packets coming
through, the size of the buffer at the receiving end must be
able to accommodate all incoming packets. This method is
popular because of its simplicity. It does not need two-way
authentication and it is not bound by tight synchronization.
An improvement designed to implement solutions to these
deficiencies is developed in [133] called the Tesla++. Similarly
to the original algorithm, Tesla++ broadcasts authentication
keys in a symmetric manner. However, instead of storing
all messages and their corresponding MACs, the receiver
only stores the MAC. Therefore, there is a large reduction
in the amount of memory that is needed at the receiver.
However, much like the original algorithm, Tesla++ still has
high overhead and is prone to DoS attacks.
The RSU-aided message authentication scheme (RAISE) is
a novel approach to vehicle authentication using symmetric
functions [91]. In this method, the RSU is responsible for all
authentication. This algorithm assumes that messages coming
from the RSU do not need to be verified, which leads to
a significant decrease in the total overhead of the network.
The RSU is responsible for distribution of a short hash key
which is used as an authentication method for inter-vehicle
communication. In addition, the RSU must also assign unique
identification numbers for each vehicle within the network,
which introduces another level of security into the network.
Through simulations, the authors were able to prove that the
overhead of RAISE is significantly less than group-based and
public-key infrastructure schemes (PKI). One drawback of this
method is its reliance on the integrity of the RSU. If an attacker
were able to impersonate an RSU they would gain total control
of the network. Additionally, because of the reliance of the
algorithm on a central node (the RSU), DoS attacks can have
significant effects on the network if they are aimed at the
RSU.
Pseudorandom authentication can also be used to authen-
ticate a vehicle, both in vehicle-to-vehicle authentication
and vehicle-to-roadside unit (RSU) authentication. In [92] a
pseudorandom method is used to authenticate users at the
RSU. Each user is sent out a pseudorandom that no other
vehicle on the network knows. This keeps the identity of
each user hidden and known only by the RSU. Pseudonymous
authentication with conditional privacy (PACP) is used to
generate the pseudorandom keys. When a user registers at
the motor-vehicle department they are handed a ticket with
a unique ID which is used to authenticate them and generate
a pseudorandom key. Although this scheme is effective, it has
very high overhead and is prone to identity theft, as malicious
nodes could possibly intercept or copy the ticket acquired at
the motor-vehicle department. A similar scheme is presented
where the RSU sends out a large number of pseudorandom
keys and matching certificates. These messages are sent to all
users on the network. Then when a user wants to transmit
they would do so by using the pseudorandom key. When the
message reaches the receiver it can be authenticated using the
corresponding certificate. Similarly to the previous method,
this algorithm needs a large amount of overhead.
In [93] an elliptic-curve digital signature algorithm
(ECDSA)-based scheme is proposed. A typical ECDSA
scheme works in three stages: the key generation, signature
generation, and signature verification stages. In order for a
vehicle to be authenticated, they must be able to generate
a valid signature, using a public key, whereas the signature
generation phase has a low computational complexity associ-
ated with it. The highest computational complexity lies in the
signature-verification phase, where the receiver must verify
that the signature is legitimate from a large list of possible
signatures. The method proposed in [93] introduces a scheme
that implements an ECDSA verification engine that is able
to verify up to 27000 signatures per second. This presents a
significant reduction of latency within the network. A latency
of 37 microseconds for a single signature verification and an
efficiency of 24.5 sGE were achieved, which is a significant
improvement when compared to previous methods.
A secure and authenticated key-management protocol
(SAKMP) is presented in [94]. SAKMP is a distributed key-
management protocol that assigns public keys to users based
on their geographic location. The key is generated using a
function that ensures that each key is unique and dependent on
the ID of the user and their location. The location of the users
is obtained using GPS. In order for the algorithm to generate
unique keys, a 3D position must be established. The key is
generated using the x, y, and z coordinates. The algorithm
is only concerned with secure communication between the
RSU and the OBUs. It would be difficult to implement this
algorithm in vehicle-to-vehicle communication because of its
dependence on location and fairly complicated key generation
function. Much like the other symmetric-encryption based
methods, storing a large number of keys has a very large
overhead, especially for vehicle-to-vehicle communication.
A scalable and efficient group rekeying protocol based
solely on symmetric-key cryptography called GKMPAN is
presented in [95]. GKMPAN attempts to exploit the properties
of ad hoc networks to propagate group keys from one host to
another. This reduces the risk of eavesdropping and ensures
that the key is only distributed to trusted users. In order to keep
each group key secret, prior to the deployment of the ad hoc
network a key encryption key is distributed for delivering keys
safely. Keys are distributed and updated at intervals to ensure
a higher level of security. The current key can be decoded
by a user even if they missed previous keys. This makes the
algorithm stateless. This method is simple and effective. Since
group keying is used, some of the overhead of having to
generate a key for each user is alleviated. This means that
the algorithm proposed in [95] is highly scalable. However,
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since only a single key of keys is generated, if an attacker
was to obtain it they would be able to get all subsequent keys.
Since keys are passed on through the network, as the network
becomes large, severe bottlenecks could form.
2) Asymmetric Encryption: Asymmetric cryptography is
based on a two-key system (Figure 9). A user sends out a
public key that is distributed to every member of the network.
This key is used by other users on the network to send
encrypted messages to the reference user. It is not computa-
tionally feasible to decrypt the message without a private key
which only the original node has. Asymmetric cryptology is
more secure than Symmetric cryptography because the private
key is kept from the public. No secret channel is necessary
for the exchange of keys because the public key acts as a
secure communication method. Asymmetric cryptology also
generates significantly fewer keys. For example, asymmetric
keys only need 2n secret keys, where n is the number of
users on the network, whereas, symmetric keys would need
nx(n+1)/2 keys in order to securely communicate. One of its
disadvantages over symmetric cryptography is that it is much
slower because of the harder mathematical problems associ-
ated with encryption and decryption using separate keys. The
keys must also be longer in order for asymmetric cryptography
to be effective.
The following section describes a number of algorithms that
use asymmetric cryptography to establish secure communica-
tions between vehicles, infrastructure, and humans.
A Peer-to-Peer Anonymous Authentication (PPAA) method
proposed in [96] makes the assumption that all clients and
servers are equal as peers, unlike conventional schemes that
assume authentication must only be done for the client and
never the server. This method ensures that both the server
and the client must be authenticated to achieve maximum
security. PPAA introduces a novel system in which peers; are
pseudonymous to individual peers, although users are able to
authenticate each other if they have previously been in contact
they remain anonymous. The algorithm uses a centralized
node called a General Manager (GM) whose sole purpose is
efficient setup and registration of the nodes. It is important
to note that this scheme cannot validate more than one node
at a time, which can cause problems in large networks where
many nodes are transmitting concurrently. Since this scheme
relies on a peer-to-peer framework users remain anonymous,
but a new session must be started each time a user wants to
communicate with another user. This could cause unwanted
overhead.
In [97] a pseudonym-based authentication method is used
to secure communication in VANETs. A hybrid scheme is
proposed that uses group signatures to generate on-the-fly
pseudonym keys which, in a similar way to the algorithm
presented in [96], allow users to remain anonymous within
the network. In this scheme, a user registers within a group,
at which point they are given the group public key that can
be used to authenticate their messages. This method has low
computational complexity and allows the users to quickly
authenticate their messages using a group dynamic. Through
the use of group public keys, the authors have reduced the
amount of storage that is needed to execute this method.
Fig. 9. Asymmetric encryption
However, the use of group keys could lead to serious breaches
in the security framework. If an adversary was able to gain
access to the group keys they would be able to authenticate
their own messages.
A privacy-preserving group communication scheme for
VANETs (PPGCV) is proposed in [98]. The algorithm works
in two phases. In the first phase, each user on the network
is given a pool of keys which is randomly distributed. These
keys are used for Key Encrypting Keys (KEKs). To ensure
that users within the group can communicate, a group key
is also established which can be used to change the pool of
keys in case they are compromised. If a single user on the
network is compromised the central authority assumes that
all keys are compromised. This scheme has a comprehensive
method for key relocation and as such has the advantage of
being robust and hard to predict. But it does add overhead
to the network. In addition, during the key reallocation users
are left with no encryption methods and cannot transmit
data, further decreasing network efficiency. This method also
assumes that users can keep track of which keys have been
compromised which puts an additional burden on them. If this
is not managed properly then revoked keys can be used by
attackers.
A VANET key-management scheme based on Temporary
Anonymous Certified Keys (TACKs) is introduced in [99]. In
this method, users are grouped according to their location.
Users that are in close proximity are given a single group
public. Regional Authorities (RAs) are appointed within each
group to distribute certificates. A TACK is a short-term cer-
tificate that is acquired from the RA. The TACK is used for
signing messages; it is a method of authenticating each vehicle
within the group. When a vehicle enters a new geographical
area or after some set period of time the TACK expires and a
new one is issued. This ensures that attackers are not able to
associate any particular key with any particular user. The new
key is generated randomly by each vehicle after their previous
key has expired. The new key along with the group user key
is sent out for authentication by the RA. The RA authenticates
the key and updates its internal records accordingly. This
scheme’s main advantage is the minimal overhead associated
with it, especially at the OBU. Most of the computational
complexity and authentication is done at the RA. A disad-
vantage is that the scheme is very infrastructure-dependent
14
and cannot be used in a distributed environment. Temporary
Authentication and Revocation Indicator (TARI), an algorithm
based on TACK, was proposed in [134]. It is based on the same
security principles as TACK. TARI also uses group signatures
that are dependent on the geographical location of the OBUs.
TARI has a different method of authentication. It uses an AI to
authenticate OBUs after they have received a message. Each
user is verified within their own group. Its primary advantage
over TACK is that it uses symmetric-key cryptography, which
significantly reduces its overhead. However, it suffers from the
same drawbacks at TACK, which makes it highly dependent
on a centralised topology.
A method called Group Signature and Identity (ID)-based
Signature (GSIS) is used to tackle security and conditional
privacy in vehicular networks [100]. GSIS proposes to use
another two-step process to ensure a high level of security. It
groups vehicles into clusters based on their location. Then,
using a group structure each vehicle is able to securely
communicate with each other in a safe and secure manner.
Users outside the cluster are ignored. A significant reduction
in computational complexity is achieved, as only a single key
has to be stored. This could present a problem: if an attacker
were to acquire the public key they would be treated as a
part of the group. Communication between the road-side unit
and the cars is achieved using ID-based cryptography. Each
message is sent out with a digital signature called an ID.
The ID numbers for the road-side units are used as public
keys, whereas, the licence plates of the vehicles are used
as their public keys. The main contribution of this paper
is a lightweight accurate algorithm that is able to ensure
a high level of authentication for vehicular communication.
The drawback of this method is its susceptibility to man-in-
the-middle-attacks, especially within the cluster configuration
where vehicle-to-vehicle communication is conducted.
Secure revocable anonymous authenticated inter-vehicle
communication (SRAAC) is an encryption method designed
to make autonomous car networks safer and more reliable
[101]. SRAAC has three distinct stages. The first is an
OBU Registration, then a Certificate Issuance, Anonymity
Revocation and finally the actual communication including
Signature and Verification of messages. The CA sends out
multiple certificates to a single OBU, ensuring that even if
one is compromised the OBU can use the other keys. The
certificates are generated and distributed blindly, making this
method completely anonymous. A tag is kept for every set
of certificates that are sent. The primary reason for this is
to be able to revoke the rights of the user if they become
compromised. This method has overhead and enables users
to be completely anonymous. However, other nodes in the
network would find it difficult to know which users have been
misbehaving, making it difficult to isolate malicious nodes.
3) Attribute-based Encryption: Attribute-based encryption
(ABE) is a form of encryption that uses specific attributes (or
a set of attributes) to encrypt data, as shown in Figure 10. As
such, in order to decrypt the data one must have a satisfactory
configuration/combination of attributes [135]. Attribute-based
encryption was first introduced in 2005 by Sahai and Walters
in [136]. They presented attribute-based encryption as an
Fig. 10. Architecture for a typical ABE [138]
application of Fuzzy Identity based Encryption. This was
later expanded in [137], where the authors present a general
framework for attribute based cryptology, seen as a more
flexible alternative to the rigid traditional public-private key
cryptography. Instead of using fixed public and private keys,
encryption is done using specific attributes. The attributes are
taken from a pool which includes an entire library. Only users
or groups of users that have attributes, that are the same as
the ones chosen, are able to decrypt the message.
This form of encryption is quickly becoming very pop-
ular because of its flexibility, effectiveness, and efficiency.
In [102] a Secure, Selective Group Broadcast in Vehicular
Networks using Dynamic Attribute-Based Encryption is pre-
sented. In traditional attribute-based methods, key generation
is based on a combination of certain attributes. The attributes
selected depend on the policy of the sender. This again
depends on what user/group of users the sender intended the
message for. When an attribute expires or needs to be replaced,
the entire set of attributes must be replaced. This causes
considerable overhead and delay. This is especially a problem
in vehicular based networks, where the number of users within
a network is highly dynamic. The authors in [102], propose
an algorithm that uses attribute-based cryptology where each
attribute is treated independently, as opposed to a set. When a
single attribute elapses or needs to be replaced for some other
reason, it is replaced independently and without the need to
change the other attributes. The main advantage of this method
is the significant reduction in the overhead of the network.
However, synchronization between users about which attribute
is relevant and which has been changed presents a problem in
practical implementation. A similar scheme is presented in
[139], where the authors present an algorithm that looks to
dynamically add and remove attributes without affecting the
rest of the access control policy tree. In [139] a fading function
is introduced to each attribute, making attributes dynamic and
independent. Although this algorithm presents the problem and
solution in a slightly different framework it has very similar
advantages and disadvantages.
In [103], an Attribute-Based Access-Control System
(ABACS) is proposed to enable improved efficiency of emer-
gency vehicles over VANETs. When an emergency occurs it
is important for the emergency vehicle (EV) to be able to
get to the site of the emergency as quickly and efficiently as
possible. The EV must be able to communicate efficiently with
roadside units (RSUs). RSUs must be able to identify which
EVs are close by and which can respond to the emergency
the fastest. Road-side units broadcast a message encrypted
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TABLE IV
CRYPTOGRAPHIC DEFENCES
Method Key idea Advantages Disadvantages
2FLIP [90] Uses decentralized CA and biological pass-
word
Reduces message delay, low mes-
sage loss ratio
Telematics devices are required for
all vehicles
TESLA [66] A loose time synchronous authentication
between sender and receiver
Simplicity High overhead, prone to DoS at-
tack
RAISE [91] RSU-based authentication Scalability, low overhead Not resilient against the RSU com-
promisation, prone to DoS attack
PACP [92] Motor vehicle department gives unique ID
to the vehicles for authentication
Scalability Prone to identity theft, high over-
head
ECDSA [93] Provides an implementation of ECDSA for
a fast signature verification
Low latency Proper implementation of ECDSA
is difficult
SA-KMP [94] Uses geographic information of the vehicle
for key generation
Robust against DoS attack Overhead of storing a large number
of keys
GKMPAN [95] Utilizes the nodes of the network for a hop-
by-hop key propagation
Overhead of key generation is dis-
tributed
Does not preserve the privacy of
the nodes
PPAA [96] Considers authentication of not only clients
but also servers
Secret handshake Not suitable for a large-scale net-
work, overhead
Calandriello et al. [97] Combines pseudonym-based approach with
group signatures
Reduces overhead serious breaches in the security
framework
PPGCV [98] A probabilistic key distribution approach Preserving the privacy of the nodes,
robust
Overhead of key relocation
TACKs [99] Utilizes short-lived keys that are certified by
regional authorities
Reduces overhead especially at the
OBU
Low speed is the main disadvan-
tage of asymmetric encryption
GSIS [100] Integrates group signature and identity-
based signature schemes
High level of authentication Heavy verification procedure for
large verification lists
SRAAC [101] Uses blinded certificate issuance for provid-
ing anonymity
Anonimity, non-repudiation Overhead of a message certifica-
tion by multiple servers, low speed
DABE [102] Allows users to change the attributes that
are associated with their private keys
Reduces overhead Synchronization, not applicable to
unpredictable attribute changes
ABACS [103] Utilizes attribute-based encryption for emer-
gency services
Flexible and scalable access con-
trol
attribute revocation mechanism is a
key challenge of ABE
Xia et al. [104] Uses CP-ABE scheme for multi-hop multi-
media data transmission in VANETs
Privacy-preserving, access control It is heavily dependent on the struc-
ture of the network
Bouabdellah et al. [105] Combines CP-ABE and trust management
scheme for multi-hop V2V communication
Anonymity, access control Overhead of calculating and stor-
ing trust and reputation values
using attribute encryption that uses attributes such as location,
type of emergency vehicle (depending on the emergency this
would be a police car, an ambulance or a fire truck) and event
type. The emergency vehicles that have these attributes are
the only ones that are able to decrypt the message. When an
emergency vehicle encrypts the message they get the relevant
information and are able to respond. The algorithm presented
by the authors offers high security and reduces the overhead
since only a single broadcast message has to be sent.
In [104] an adaptive multimedia data-forwarding method
is proposed for privacy preservation in vehicular ad hoc
networks. This paper puts forward a scheme that reduces the
overhead placed on on-board units in vehicles. It does this
by allowing road-side units to perform a large portion of the
overall encryption. Unlike conventional schemes, this paper
presents a framework for not only short messages, but also
multimedia applications such as social media. It does this by
ensuring that the overhead is spread between the on-board unit
and the road-side unit. Therefore, it is important for vehicles
to effectively pick which RSU they are going to involve in
the dissemination process. Since decryption takes time it is
important that the vehicle remains within the transmission
range of the RSU, otherwise they will receive partial or
incomplete information. Attribute-based encryption is used
by both the RSU and the OBU to ensure that users with
the appropriate attributes are the only ones that receive the
message. This method reduces the computational overhead to
the RSUs, which enables them to be smaller and cheaper to
implement. It relies heavily on the structure of the network.
In large networks, there is a possibility that the RSU would
be overwhelmed with large quantities of traffic, causing a
bottleneck in the network.
A distributed multi-hop algorithm is proposed in [105],
where the authors present a protocol that can be utilized when
no direct link between the vehicle and the road-side unit exist.
Much work has gone into RSU to OBU communications,
but situations where OBUs are out of the range of RSUs
are yet to be dealt with effectively. The primary issue with
relaying information across the network is that malicious
users between the source and destination could have a large
impact [?], [140]. To tackle this a scheme using attribute-
based encryption is employed to ensure that only users that
have the right attributes receive and are able to read the
message, and a reputation-based function is used to ensure
that the messages are passed over the safest possible path. The
framework for the reputation/trust function is poorly defined.
Additional storage and overhead are added in order to calculate
the reputation and then store the reputation of each secondary
user on the network. However, this scheme is not independent
of a centralized topology. OBUs are able to communicate in
a distributed manner, which would be quite effective in more
remote areas or when the RSU is under attack.
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A fine-grained privacy-preserving protocol is introduced in
[141], which is used to allow service providers to offer certain
services to certain vehicles within the network. The algorithm
uses attribute-based encryption to ensure that only vehicles that
are authorised are able to access the services that are offered
by the service providers. Different attributes allow users to
access different services. To further add security, a secret
sharing scheme is proposed to enforce the fine grained access
control requirements. The algorithm also allows vehicles to
remain anonymous by using pseudonyms as unique ID-based
signatures. This algorithm is well defined, and it is very
effective in ensuring that service providers only allow certain
users to access their services. It also allows for vehicles to
remain anonymous. However, there are some concerns that the
algorithm would have a high overhead in practical situations,
especially in large networks.
4) Summarising Cryptographic Defences: It is necessary
here to compare cryptography-based algorithms used to en-
hance the security of intelligent vehicules. Table IV gives a
comparative view of above-mentioned cryptographic defences
and focuses on their key idea, advantages, and disadvantages.
Cryptography in VANETs is key to providing safety and
security for users and service providers. However, many of
the existing cryptographical standards and practises are inade-
quate for the new generation of VANETs. Current cytological
standards are often overly complicated and place a high
computational burden on users. They are seldom suitable for
real time high speed applications that VANETs are inevitably
becoming. Latency or a delay in communications between the
vehicle and the road-side unit could cause serious accidents
for users. It is therefore key that cytological standards are
lightweight, but secure. It must be noted, that security is
paramount in VANETs and even though real time applications
require low latency, security must also be considered as a
priority. Therefore, the application of cryptology algorithms in
VANETs must consider the tradeoff between the security of
the network and the user, against, application based parameters
that enable low latency and delay.
To solve these problems we propose a number of solutions
throughout this paper, these include but are not limited to
new 3GPP standards, software defined networks, light authen-
tication and block chaining (BC). In the previous sections,
we discussed a number of lightweight authentications meth-
ods. In the sections that follow we discuss 3GPP standards
and software defined radios. Another promising solution to
the problems faced by VANETs is block chaining. As an
illustration, blockchain is a distributed data structure that can
manage financial transactions without the need to a centralized
authority. In other words, a genuine copy of digital ledger is
shared among the parties. Besides, in order to validate new
transactions, public-key cryptography is utilized for providing
multi-signature protection [142]. In [142] an IoT based block
chaining method is discussed. IoT requires similar attributes
from security protocols as VANETs, they both require low
latency and computational complexity as well as a high level of
security. It is concluded that blockchain enhances the security
of authentication and authorization and also provides a strong
defence against IoT security attacks such as IP spoofing. This
Fig. 11. (a) Signatute-based detection; (b) Anomaly-based detection
is primarily due to their high level of security and scalability
[142].
In [143] the authors present a framework for a lightweight
algorithm that is secure and has low overhead. It is claimed
that the fundamental security goals of confidentiality, in-
tegrity, and availability are considered and delivered using
the approach presented in the paper. Significant reductions
in overhead were achieved and confirmed through simulation
of a variety of scenarios. In [144] a similar algorithm is
presented that is lightweight and preserves all the security
features of traditional blockchain algorithms. They proposed
an architecture that uses distributed trust to reduce the block
validation processing time. The experimentation and trials
were conducted in a smart home setting which has similar
goals and constraints of VANETs. Simulation of the proposed
framework indicates that it has low packet overhead and low
processing overhead.
B. Network Security
Intelligent vehicles require cooperation from other devices
and sensors to perform communications. These communica-
tions are implemented between the Controller Area Network
(CAN) and the Electronic Control Units (ECUs), and security
mechanisms have not been considered in these settings at all.
The CAN and ECUs are valuable targets for adversaries. For
example, vehicles can connect to wired devices using USB,
CD, wireless such as 3G, 4G, WiFi and smartphone, and all
of these make the car become an open system. Therefore,
it is very necessary to invent suitable countermeasures to
relieve the security risks in the intelligent car. Considering
that Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are the most closely
countermeasure and the most reliable approach [145], [83],
[146] in terms of protecting vehicular networks or traditional
computer networks, this section reviews related work using
IDS in intelligent cars. As shown in Figure 11, there are
two main classes of IDS including signature-based detection
and anomaly-based detection. Recently published works [147],
[148], [149] have discussed possible ways of securing vehicles
from remote attack by assuming the defense strategy as a
network intrusion detection problem. Recently, 3GPP has
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working in verifying that 5G systems are able to utilise 256-
bit symmetric cryptography mechanisms inherited from legacy
4G systems. The handover from one system architecture to the
next must remain seamless. As a matter of fact, legacy security
visibility and configurability functionality are developing with
technology evolution and in the future, devices will be more
reactive and flexible to various security configurations.
1) Signature-based Detection: This method first stores
various existing signatures of known attacks in a database
for retrieving and making a comparison. Then, it detects
the intrusion attack by comparing oncoming cases from the
Internet of Vehicle with existing signatures of known attacks
in store.
Bißmeyer et al. [106] developed a signature-based IDS that
utilizes a plausibility model for vehicle movement data. The
proposed scheme is able to detect a single fake vehicle even
if it uses a valid movement. Two kinds of attackers can be
detected using the proposed algorithm: 1) a fake congestion
attack; 2) a denial of congestion attack.
Tomandl et al. [107] introduced a novel IDS called REST-
Net for Vehicular Ad hoc Networks (VANETs) to check fake
messages. Different from previous solutions, REST-Net uses
a dynamic engine to analyze and monitor the data, and it
achieves very high detection rates and adaptive warning levels
in case drivers are interrupted. It is also implemented with a
concept which is used for recalling the fake message as long
as an attacker is identified.
One of the disadvantages is that it usually causes high false-
negative rates when facing unknown or new attacks. Another
disadvantage is that signature-based detection fails to detect
intrusions with the development of onboard applications. For
example, signature-based detection may be invalid sometimes
as more and more extra devices such as sensors are integrated
into vehicles.
2) Anomaly-based Detection: Anomaly-based detections
predefines the baseline of normal cases, then new types of
attack can be identified once they are observed to have
abnormal information beyond the baseline [150].
Cho and Shin [108] developed a Clock-based IDS (CIDS)
for intrusion detection. CIDS constructs a baseline of ECUs’
clock behaviors based on the thus-derived fingerprints which
are extracted from the intervals of periodic in-vehicle mes-
sages. Then, CIDS employs Cumulative Sum to detect any
abnormal shifts (i.e. signs of intrusion) in the identification
errors. Experiments showed that CIDS could achieve a low
false-positive rate of 0.055%.
Martynov et al. [109] developed a software-based light-
weight IDS based on properties selected from the signal
database. Then, the authors studied the message cycle time and
the plausibility of the messages, and introduced two anomaly-
based methods for IDS. Experiments were conducted in terms
of both simulation and real-world scenarios. Experimental re-
sults demonstrate that some malicious events such as injection
of malformed CAN frames, unauthorized CAN frames as well
as Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks can be recognized by the
proposed IDS.
Sedjelmaci and Senouci [110] proposed a novel intrusion
detection framework for a vehicular network (IDFV) utilizing
detection and eviction techniques. IDFV is implemented in
two detection agents: a local intrusion-detection module and
global intrusion-detection-module. Experiments demonstrate
that IDFV exhibits a very high detection rate with more than
98% and a low false-positive rate of lower than 1.3%.
Song et al. [111] proposed a light-weight intrusion-detection
strategy by analyzing the time intervals of CAN messages. The
authors first experimentally show the difference between time
intervals of messages in the normal status and in the under-
attack status. Then, experiments were conducted based on the
CAN messages from the cars made by a famous manufacturer.
The results show the effectiveness of the proposed method.
Zaidi et al. [83] presented a statistical-technique-based IDS
for anomalies and rogue-nodes detection using a traffic model.
The proposed IDS can work independently without relying on
any infrastructure. In order to use the proposed mechanism,
network message congestion is controlled to avoid broadcast
storms. Experiments show that the proposed IDS can keep the
network working even if up to 40% of nodes are malicious.
Lee et al. [112] studied the offset ratio and time interval
of message response performance, and proposed an intrusion-
detection method. The proposed method assumes that the
receiver node will respond to the remote frame immediately
once a particular identifier is transmitted. It also assumes
that the response performance should be different between an
attack-free state and an attack state. In order to enhance the
overall performance and accuracy of the proposed strategy,
a novel algorithm is also proposed to monitor the change of
in-vehicle nodes. OTIDS can achieve very good performance
without modifying the CAN protocol. Moreover, it can not
only identify message injection attacks and impersonating
node attack but also can detect the types of messages in the
injection attacks.
Yu et al. proposed a Presence Evidence System (PES) [113].
PES is a statistical method for detecting Sybil attacks in
VANETs. The authors have considered signal-strength distri-
bution analysis of vehicles to estimate their physical position
because position verification is regarded as one of the best
methods for the detection of Sybil attacks. When a claimer
node broadcasts a beacon message at a beacon interval for the
purpose of neighboring discovery, an estimated position will
be calculated for the claimer. The main idea is to improve
estimating the position of a vehicle by using a random-sample
consensus (RANSAC)-based method. It should be mentioned
that the RANSAC algorithm is a well-known learning method
in the field of computer vision for outliers detection. The main
limitation of the PES, however, is that it cannot detect all Sybil
attacks.
AECFV is an intrusion detection mechanism introduced
by Sedjelmaci and Senouci [84]. In fact, AECFV includes
intrusion-detection systems at three levels: (1) cluster members
level; (2) cluster heads (CH) level; (3) Road-Side Units (RSU)
level. It should be noted that, along with a rule-based decision
technique and a trust-based scheme, AECFV makes use of a
Support Vector Machine (SVM) as a machine-learning method
to detect anomalies at the cluster level. As a matter of fact, in
machine learning, SVMs are supervised learning models that
are used for solving classification problems, not to mention
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that SVMs are a major area of interest in the field of anomaly
detection. Furthermore, feature extraction, the training process,
and the classification process are the three main components
of the SVM in the proposed model. Moreover, the detection
mechanism of AECFV against different and various types of
attacks on vehicular ad hoc networks has been discussed.
AECFV is expected to suit scenarios such as a lightweight
communication overhead as well as fast attacks detection.
However, inasmuch as AECFV needs to implement IDS on
lots of vehicles as cluster members, it causes a high overhead
in large-scale vehicular networks. In the same way, other
studies by Sharma and Kaul [151], Wahab et al. [152], and
Sedmalci et al. [153] use SVMs for intrusion detection of
vehicular networks.
Recent developments in the field of machine learning have
also led to a renewed interest in designing intelligent IDSs
for in-vehicle anomalies. One study by Markovitz et al. [79]
has involved designing a domain-aware anomaly detection
system for the CAN traffic bus in which ternary content-
addressable memories (TCAMs) have been used for detecting
anomalies in CAN bus network traffic. It must be mentioned
that TCAMs are special types of high-speed memories that
modern switches and routers use them for fast route lookup
and packet classification. At first, in the learning phase, TCMA
learns how to classify CAN packets into three categories:
constant, multi-value, counter/sensor. Then, in the testing
phase, the TCMA classifier detects irregular messages that
do not match the trained model. The authors have evaluated
the proposed scheme by simulated CAN bus traffic and also
by real traffic data. It should be mentioned that TCMA is
implementable in both software and hardware.
Zhang et al. [114] proposed the idea of collaboration of
vehicles in vehicular networks in order to manage a machine-
learning scheme against malicious nodes. The authors argued
that privacy is a serious concern for the proposed approach,
PML-CIDS, because vehicles may exchange sensitive informa-
tion. PML-CIDS consists of different parts: The pre processing
engine is responsible for collecting and preprocessing data.
The local detection engine is a logistic-regression classifier
which is responsible for intrusion detection by analyzing the
preprocessed data and determining malicious activities. The
P-CML engine is responsible for updating the classifier. The
main philosophy of PML-CIDS is decentralizing a central-
ized machine-learning approach. For solving this problem,
a distributive optimization method called Alternating Direct
Method for Multipliers (ADMM) has been used to decentral-
ize regularized empirical-risk-minimization (ERM) algorithms
to achieve distributed training of large datasets. Moreover,
PML-CIDS employs a privacy-preserving scheme of regular-
ized ERM-based optimization called dual-variable perturbation
(DVP) which perturbs the dual variable of each vehicle at
every ADMM iteration. It should be noted that PML-CIDS is a
distributive approach and decreases the overhead. In fact, with
the huge size of training data, a centralized machine-learning
approach can lead to communications overhead. Moreover,
PML-CIDS preserves privacy because vehicles do not have
direct data communication [154].
The disadvantages of anomaly-based detection are: 1) it
may cause high false-positive rates; 2) it is usually hard to
prepare proper metrics to determine the baseline. However, it
is expected that data analysis techniques can help to improve
the performance in the future.
3) Summarising Network Security Defences: In this part of
the paper, most popular network security defences of vehic-
ular networks are compared. Table V lists network security
defences and compares their merits and demerits.
C. Software Vulnerability Detection
1) Static Analysis: Static analysis is a set of program
analysis methods to check and verify properties of program
code without the need to execute it [155], [156]. It is helpful
for finding structure errors and security vulnerabilities in a
program so as to ensure the quality and security of software.
Static analysis could detect software run-time errors that are
difficult to find by testing, including resource leaks, illegal op-
erations like illegal arithmetic expressions, dead code, program
termination problem, unreachable, and unusable data [155].
Currently, static analysis methods are also applied to extract
features of code for software vulnerability detection using
machine learning, which will be discussed in the following.
There are several common techniques of static analysis for
securing software systems. Lexical analysis is a technique
to scan the source code and transfer it to a token stream
then match the token stream against vulnerable constructs
to find potential vulnerabilities [157]. Control-flow analysis
is a technique to build the control-flow graph (CFG) of the
program. A node of the graph represents a basic code block
and a directed edge represents a program execution path.
Control-flow analysis could illustrate the logic of the program
and evaluate whether the program could terminate normally
and which part of the code is dead. It is also the foundation
of some other analysis techniques. Control-flow integrity (CFI)
is a technique that uses the normal CFG to detect attacks that
aim to control the system by changing the normal behavior
of software [158]. Data flow analysis is a technique to collect
run-time information about data in programs [159]. It traverses
the CFG to record the initialize and reference blocks of
variables and their related data to construct data flow. The data
flow could be used to classify the vulnerable variables, input
and code segments. Taint analysis is a technique to identify
whether variables that accept input from an external user
interface over the data flow could cause critical implications
on the system.
There are several research projects on applying static
analysis for detecting software vulnerabilities and defense
attacks. [115] implemented the integration of CFI with the
production compilers GCC and LLVM. In their experiments,
the proposed CFI mechanisms could protect 95% to 99.8%
of indirect function calls of C++ programs. [116] proposed
using static analysis approaches to detect vulnerabilities in
web applications. The authors refined the taint analysis by
adding a persistent database store (PDS) to collect all data
to detect second-order vulnerabilities like second-order cross-
site scripting and SQL injection. The experiment shows the
proposed taint analysis identifying 159 previously unknown
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TABLE V
NETWORK SECURITY DEFENCES
Method Key idea Advantages Disadvantages
Bißmeyer et al. [106] Uses position information of vehicles to
detect message forgery
Additional hardware (radar, lidar,
camera) are not required
Accuracy of GPSs, movements of
vehicles, data transmission delays
REST-Net [107] Utilizes data plausibility checks to analyze
and detect an attacker’s fake messages
High detection rate, high adaptabil-
ity
Ineffective against unknown at-
tacks
CIDS [108] Estimates clock skew of CAN messages to
detect intrusion
Evaluation in real conditions, low
false positive rate
CIDS cannot detect irregular time
sequence attacks
Martynov et al. [109] Simulates anomaly-based detection against
DoS attacks on wireless sensors
Protects nodes against unknown at-
tacks
The simulation is performed on a
limited number of fixed nodes
IDFV [110] Uses rule-based, learninig-based, and trust-
based techniques to detect malicious nodes
High detection rate, low false pos-
itive rate
Overhead of using many tech-
niques
Song et al. [111] analyzes the frequency of CAN messages to
detect message injection and DoS attack
Lightweight Cannot guarantee protection
against other types of attacks
Zaidi et al. [83] Vehicles collect and analyze traffic informa-
tion of other vehicles to train the IDS
High accuracy, low overhead Dose not consider data communi-
cation attacks
OTIDS [112] Considers offset and time intervals of CAN
messages to detect three types of attacks
accurate, low detection time IDS cannot detect attacks with ir-
regular remote frames
PES [113] Uses RANSAC to improve estimating phys-
ical position of vehicles
Robust estimation RANSAC can only estimate one
model for a particular dataset
AECFV [84] Uses support vector machine at cluster
heads
High detection rate, low false pos-
itive
High overhead
Markovitz et al. [79] Uses TCAM for CAN packets classification CAN packets are easy to represent
as TCAMs, adaptable
Not tested against different attack
scenarios
PML-CIDS [114] Uses DVP approach to decentralize a cen-
tralized machine learning approach
Decreases overhead, provides a
certain degree of privacy, scalable
Computational complexity
vulnerabilities. [117] proposed a stronger CFI called path-
sensitive variation of CFI that could block more attacks. [118]
proposed an implementation of data flow integrity enforcement
that could detect attacks and errors of C and C++ programs
with low overhead. FindBugs [119] is an open-source static
analysis tool to look for bugs of a java program. Google uses
the program to check the source code and build code-review
policies.
The main advantage of static analysis is that it does not
execute the code so it has fast execution and high efficiency.
On the other hand, for a large-scale software system, it is
hard for a human to review the code and find potential bugs
carefully. The static analysis is able to detect vulnerabilities
and errors automatically. However, a high false-positive rate
is an important disadvantage of static analysis, which means
that it may report many vulnerabilities that are actually not
vulnerable. Now some research projects try to combine static
analysis and machine-learning techniques to solve the prob-
lem.
2) Dynamic Analysis: In contrast to static analysis, dy-
namic analysis depends on running the program to examine
whether it has errors and vulnerabilities [160]. The main two
techniques of dynamic analysis are fuzzing and dynamic taint
analysis. Fuzzing is a kind of automated approach that involves
sending invalid or random data to the program and monitoring
whether the program would crash or be in an error condition
[161]. During this process, potential software vulnerabilities
could be detected. Dynamic taint analysis is a technique that
aims to analyze marked information flow when the program is
executed, and this method could detect most of the software
vulnerabilities [162].
Fuzzing is a proactive method to find software flaws. In
addition, it is also applied to quality-assurance processes by
monitoring the product lifecycle and product maturity [163].
There are three categories of fuzzing. The first one is black-box
fuzzing that does not analyze the program and just generates
random data as input. In the research of Godefroid et al.
[120], the author used black box fuzzing tools to find more
than 20 previously unknown vulnerabilities of a Windows
software. White-box fuzzing is another one that needs to
analyze the program to get information about the program first.
It could generate more specific input but the efficiency is not
good. Combined the advantages of black-box and white-box
fuzzing, grey-box fuzzing was proposed, which is a technique
that could get information of the internal structure about the
program without program analysis.
Dynamic taint analysis was proposed by James Newsome
and Dawn Song [121]. High detection rate for the overwrite
attacks and low false positive are the most important advan-
tages of the technique. The program value that is from a taint
source is called tainted. Dynamic taint analysis could track
how taint flows during the execution of the program to detect
potential vulnerabilities. There are two challenges of dynamic
taint analysis including over-tainting and under-tainting. Over-
tainting means the marked tainted value is not from a tainted
source and under-tainting means some information flow was
missed [164]. A precise dynamic taint analysis system should
avoid those problems. Now Dytan is a general dynamic taint
analysis framework that is used widely to detect software
vulnerabilities [122].
3) Software Testing: Comparing with static analysis, dy-
namic analysis is more accurate to find vulnerabilities because
it could analyze run-time information. Another advantage is
that dynamic analysis usually does not need source code.
However, dynamic analysis has less code coverage. Currently,
the hybrid analysis that combines static analysis and dynamic
analysis is an available approach to find software vulnerability
and secure software system better.
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TABLE VI
SOFTWARE SIZE IN INTELLIGENT VEHICLES
Manufacturer Model Software Size (lines of code)
Boeing 787 14 million
Lockheed F-22 8 million
Mercedes-Benz S series 20 million
Ford GT 10 million
Ford CES 2016 150 million
Fig. 12. X by wire
Intelligent vehicles including aircraft, airplane, and car have
million lines of code (Table VI) and software is responsible
for many safety-critical functions of the vehicle.
Drive-by-wire, brake-by-wire, suspension-by-wire and in
general X-by-wire (Figure 12) in automotive industry refers
to the use of fully electric/electronic systems for performing
vehicle functions, such as braking or steering, instead of me-
chanical or hydraulic systems [165]. Since these systems are
highly safety-critical, they must comply with safety standards
such as ISO 26262. Established traceability is one of the
requirements of these standards to ensure well tested and safe
resulting systems [166]. In this part of the paper, we will
review mutation testing as one of the major software testing
methods. As a matter of fact, this technique has been used
in many industrial practices for testing software and securing
intelligent vehicle systems. Mutation testing is a powerful soft-
ware testing for evaluating and improving software programs.
For this purpose, small defects are artificially introduced to
the original program to create mutants and then, test cases are
applied into the original program as well as the mutants. The
outputs are compared and when the results for the original
program and mutant program are different, the mutant is
detected (killed). A test case considered a good one if it can
distinguish between the behavior of the original version and
the mutants [167].
GenProg [123] is a genetic method for automatic software
repair that takes a program with a defect and a set of failing
negative and passing positive test cases to produces a 1-
minimal repair. The main theoretical premise behind using
a genetic approach is to maximize a fitness function which
evaluates the acceptability of a program variant. It should
be noted that new program variations (variants) play the role
of the chromosomes. Genetic representation of the proposed
genetic algorithm is an abstract syntax tree which includes all
of the statements in the program and a weighted path which is
a sequence of <statement, weight> pairs. Moreover, crossover
and mutation operators are utilized for creating new variants
of the mating pool. Based on the fitness values of variants, the
selection function selects the next generation members.
4) Machine Learning: In this part of the paper, a number of
significant and well-known machine-learning approaches for
software vulnerability detection are reviewed and compared
with each other. Traditional approaches to software vulnera-
bility detection are based on expertise. The work is tedious
and achieves a high false-negative rate [168]. There are two
available ways to apply machine-learning and deep-learning
methods for software vulnerability detection: Supervised learn-
ing approaches create a vulnerability prediction model and a
vulnerable code pattern recognition system using a labeled
dataset [169]. For different methods, the key difference is
the feature selection. For the software vulnerability prediction
model, software metrics that are degrees of some property
that is relative to the software are used as features to train
machine-learning and deep-learning models. For a software
vulnerability-pattern-recognition system, features are extracted
from software source code using traditional static and dynamic
program analysis methods.
Shin and Williams [124] investigated a software-
vulnerability-prediction model using the complexity of
software code, code-churn and developer-activity metrics as
a feature set. They proposed 28 software metrics including
3 code-churn metrics, 11 developer-activity metrics, and 14
complexity metrics as features to train a logistic-regression
model. Those metrics are extracted from each program
code file. Therefore, the prediction model could predict
which file is vulnerable. They conducted experiments on two
projects and found that models using the development-history
metrics could achieve over 70% recall and less than 25%
false-positive rate so they concluded that development-history
metrics are strongly relevant to vulnerability prediction.
Perl et al. [125] explored using commit information met-
rics as features to predict which commits of open-source
projects are vulnerable. They proposed that a commit sub-
mitted by a new contributor more likely has vulnerabilities,
bigger commits may have vulnerabilities and commits that
modify more developers’ work could introduce vulnerabili-
ties. They extracted relative metrics from commits to train
an SVM software-vulnerability-prediction model called VC-
CFinder. They compared their model with a traditional static-
analysis tool FlawFinder. The result showed that, when the two
tools achieved the same recall, VCCFinder had 60% precision
while FlawFinder had only 1% precision.
Zhou and Sharma [126] investigated both commits and
bug-reports metrics for vulnerability-prediction models. They
chose commit messages as commits metrics and title, de-
scription, comments, comment number, attachment number,
labels, created date, and last edited date as bug-reports metrics.
word2vec was applied to transfer those metrics to vector
features. They trained SVM, random forest, Gaussian naive
Bayes, K-nearest neighbors, AdaBoost and gradient boosting
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TABLE VII
SOFTWARE VULNERABILITY DETECTION DEFENCES
Method Key idea Advantages Disadvantages
Tice et al. [115] Uses VTV and IFCC techniques to prevent
unintended control transfers in the CFG
Low overhead It is not practical when attackers
chain edges together
Dahse and Holz [116] Static analysis of storage writings and read-
ings to detect second order vulnerabilities
Static analysis is fast for finding
and fixing vulnerabilities
Static analysis cannot pinpoint all
run-time troubles
PITTYPAT [117] Implements a path-sensitive CFI that trans-
fers control only to valid target points
increases precision of CFI mecha-
nism, acceptable run-time overhead
It is dependent on specific hard-
ware, not portable
DFI [118] Creates runtime definition table (RDT) to
guarantee data-flow integrity
Detects a broad class of attacks It makes the programs slower
FindBugs [119] Reviewes Findbugs as a static analysis tool
in Google’s testing and code review process
Simplicity Does not guarantee detection of
complicated vulnerabilities
Generational Search [120] Combines mutation-based fuzz testing ap-
proach with symbolic execution
Covers all paths of the program Overhead of path explosion in
symbolic execution
TaintCheck [121] labels data from untrusted sources and
tracks them during program execution time
High detection rate, low false pos-
itive rate
Over-tainting, under-tainting
Dytan [122] Considers not only data-flow tainting but
also control-flow tainting
Generality, high detection rate, low
false positive rate
Over-tainting, under-tainting
GenProg [123] Uses genetic algorithm approach in order to
find program bugs
Low overhead, low false positive
rate
Convergence is not guaranteed
Shin and Williams [124] Explores the relationship between three
software product metrics and vulnerability
Provides an estimation of vulnera-
ble locations
Does not guarantee software vul-
nerability detection
Perl et al. [125] Employs SVM classifier in order to detect
suspicious commits
Generality, scalability, explainabil-
ity
Difficulty of choosing good kernel
functions for SVMs
Zhou and Sharma [126] Uses a group of machine learning classifiers
to detect unidentified vulnerabilities
independent of programming lan-
guages, Scalability
Low recall rate
Shar et al. [127] Uses supervised and semi-supervised learn-
ing to detect web application vulnerabilities
Highly scalable The complexity of feature selection
VDiscover [128] Trains three machine learning classifiers to
detect memory corruption vulnerabilities
Scalability Low accuracy
models and used a K-fold stacking algorithm to ensemble
those models to improve the result. The experiment result
showed the model achieved an 83% precision rate and a 74%
recall rate.
Shar et al. [127] proposed a vulnerability pattern-recognition
system to find vulnerable code that may cause SQL injection,
cross-site scripting, remote code execution and file inclusion
in a PHP web application. They focused on code attributes
named input validation and sanitization (IVS) attributes on
the software function. Static program analysis was applied to
find features that could indicate whether a function needed
to receive inputs from different entries such as File and
client HTTP requests. control flow graph (CFG), program
dependence graph (PDG) and system dependence graph (SDG)
were applied to find features that could characterize program
functions and operations. For instance, the PHP function
str re- place(’¡’, ’ ’, $input) removes HTML tags from the
input. In fact, the presence of HTML tags in $input could
cause XSS, the function has a security property that filters
HTML tags to prevents XSS. Then a feature called ‘HTML-
tag’ was proposed to indicate whether the program function
filters HTML-tags. Finally, the paper proposed 32 attributes
related to input validation and function operation as features.
If the function contains an attribute, the corresponding fea-
ture value is 1. Therefore, the features are vectorized as
the input of machine-learning models. Random forest was
applied as the machine-learning classifier of the vulnerability-
recognition system. Results showed that the system achieved
the best performance on finding SQL injection (92% recall
and 82% precision rate) and worst performance on remote-
code-execution prediction (64% recall and 55% precision).
Grieco et al. [128] explored using machine learning to detect
memory-corruption vulnerability of C programs. They applied
static and dynamic analysis on binary code rather than source
code. Static analysis was used to extract features relative to
the call sequence of standard C libraries, and dynamic analysis
was used to capture features that show the behavior of a
program when it runs along sequential calls to the C standard
library. Logistic regression, random forest and Multiple Layers
Perceptron (MLP) were applied in their experiments. The
result showed that the model using random forest trained by
dynamical features achieved the best performance (55% true
positive rate and 17% false-positive rate).
5) Summarising Software Vulnerability Detection Defences:
Table VII briefly illustrates the comparison of software vul-
nerability detection defences in vehicular systems.
The main advantage of the software-vulnerability-prediction
model is that it does not care about the specific software
code and its implementation but just software metrics that
are easier to collect and analyze. Any software metrics could
be studied, whether they are related to software vulnerability
so it is a clear research direction. However, currently the
software metrics features are extracted on the file or commit
level, which means that the prediction model cannot find the
specific position where vulnerabilities are. Another problem
is that the software prediction model using software metrics
is totally based on the statistical relationship between metrics
and vulnerabilities, which may cause a high false-negative rate.
Vulnerability recognition systems usually apply traditional
program analysis techniques to extract features from software
source code or binary code. The feature extraction process
is more complicated than the vulnerability prediction model.
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Fig. 13. Various types of malware attacks on intelligent vehicles
The advantage of the vulnerability recognition system is that
it could find the vulnerabilities more precisely.
D. Malware Detection
Whenever something new and as complex as an intelligent
car or truck connects to the internet, it is exposed to the
full force of malicious activity. As depicted in Figure 13,
leaving an attack surface unprotected will expose vehicles
to many security risks including malware and trojans [7]. In
this section, a number of significant and well-known machine
learning approaches for malware detection are reviewed and
compared with each other.
Fan et al. [129] proposed a malicious-sequential-pattern
mining approach for automatic malware detection, called
MSPMD. The major objective of MSPMD was to investigate
a malware-detection method to recognize new, unseen mali-
cious executables. MSPMD emphasizes the order of extracted
features before classification to discover malicious sequential
patterns. At first, PE files are disassembled to the machine
instructions by the C32Asm (2011) disassembler, followed
by parsing the instructions by ignoring the operands and
encoding each operator to an instruction ID. Next, in order to
reduce the useless information, MSPMD selects instructions
according to their frequency in malicious and benign files
(feature selection). Then, the authors proposed a Malicious Se-
quential Pattern Extraction (MSPE) algorithm for discovering
malicious sequential patterns. In fact, MSPE is a modification
of the Generalized Sequential Pattern (GPS) algorithm [170].
Last, MSPMD makes use of All Nearest Neighbor (ANN) as a
machine-learning algorithm to identify malware automatically.
All in all, the detection accuracy of MSPMD is 95%.
Huda et al. [130] proposed a combination of SVM wrapper
and filtering solution for malware detection. The main theoret-
ical premise behind using an anomaly-based approach is that
detecting unknown malware is not possible using signature-
based techniques. In other words, signature-based methods
have a high false-positive rate against code-obfuscation tech-
niques such as encryption, packing, polymorphism, and meta-
morphism. This scheme is intended to extract application
programming interface (API) calls from portable executable
(PE) file formats such as (.EXE and .DLL) and then analyze
them to understand their use for malicious purposes in order
to identify malicious code. In this way, the authors have
combined a Maximum Relevance Minimum Redundancy filter
with SVM score (MRMR-SVMS). As a result, the MRMR-
SVMS approach extracts more informative API features than
either wrapper or filter alone. In other words, the proposed
approaches integrate knowledge obtained by the filter from
properties of data and the predictive accuracies of trained
classifiers. In the final analysis, the accuracy of MRMR-SVMS
is 96%.
Huda et al. [131] have also investigated how to auto-
matically integrate knowledge about unknown malware from
unlabeled data by a semi-supervised approach. In fact, the
proposed method is an integration of supervised and unsu-
pervised learning. The authors have addressed the problem of
antivirus (AV) engines which need to be updated regularly
because most malware has inbuilt code that can generate
new variants dynamically each time it is executed. There-
fore, an unsupervised approach automatically extracts dynamic
changes in malware variants using a sandbox environment and
automatically updates the database. It should be noted that log
files of the sandbox environment indicate API function calls of
executable files dynamically. Furthermore, different supervised
detection engines (Classifiers) such as Random forest, SVM,
J48, Naive Bayes, and IB are trained with labeled data for
detecting malware. In order to integrate unsupervised and
supervised methods, the authors have used the term frequency
(TF), inverse document frequency (IDF), and cosine similarity
as measures of distance in clustering unlabeled files.
CloudIntell [132] is an intelligent malware detection system
which has been designed using a combination of machine-
learning algorithms for predicting any previously unknown
malicious activity and computation offloading for reducing
the resource and power consumption of the client machine.
As a case study, the authors have employed Amazon’s EFS
(Elastic File System), SQS (Simple Queue Service) and EC2
(Elastic Compute Cloud) to store a large amount of benign
and malicious files as malware repository, request-response
queues, and detection engines respectively. Moreover, malware
repository files have been used for training and testing the
machine-learning detection methods. After feature-extraction
by an automated feature extracting tool, for the purpose
of malware detection, CloudIntell examines three types of
machine-learning classifiers: Support Vector Machine (SVM),
decision tree, and boosting on a decision tree. It must be
remembered that continuous connectivity between client and
server is an important challenge of cloud computing. In the
evaluation of CloudIntell, boosting on decision tree classifier
indicated a better performance regarding ROC curve analysis.
A comparative analysis of malware detection defences is
conducted in Table VIII. It demonstrates the key features and
points of malware detection defences, and also their merits
and demerits.
E. Comparision of Existing Security Defence Mechanisms
Security defences in intelligent vehicles are developed to
protect the in-vehicle communications and communications
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TABLE VIII
MALWARE DETECTION DEFENCES
Method Key idea Advantages Disadvantages
MSPMD [129] Uses a modified version of the k-nearest
neighbor algorithm for malware detection
High detection rate k-NN is a lazy learning algorithm
MRMR-SVMS [130] Uses the combination of SVM wrapper with
MRMR filter
Low false positive rate, low false
negative rate
Collecting API calls is time-
consuming
Huda et al. [131] Uses semi-supervised technique with unla-
beled data for dynamic feature extraction
Significant performance improve-
ment
Complexity of database update
procedure
CloudIntell [132] Computation offloading using SVM, deci-
sion tree and boosting on decision tree
Energy efficiency, high detection
rate
Continuous connectivity is required
between vehicles. The evaluation of a solution is required to
know whether a particular solution has achieved its aims or
not. The evaluation will reveal the effectiveness of security
defences against malicious attacks. The challenge here is
the fact that security defences are developed under different
deployment configurations, which complicates the process
of comparison. Herein, the experimental overview of above-
mentioned existing security defences are compared with one
another.
Generally, the challenges of the current main defence mech-
anisms are as follows:
• Cryptography: The main disadvantage of symmetric
encryption is the problem of key transportation. This
problem is solved in asymmetric encryption and exchang-
ing keys are not required. Thus, asymmetric encryption
reduces the overhead. Moreover, they can provide unde-
niable digital signatures. However, public-key encryption
is not fast enough and it uses more computer resources.
In the same vein, attribute-based encryption, that is a suit-
able mechanism for dynamic networks, is a type of public
key encryption with the same drawbacks. Provided that,
the key problem with presented cryptographic methods
is that they do not meet the performance requirement of
VANETs. In other words, vehicles need light and real-
time data transmission out of cities because of their fast-
movement nature. On the other hand, over any congested
area of the city with a traffic load of more than 100 ve-
hicles in communication range, storing and computation
of encrypted messages is really challenging [171].
• Network security: The main disadvantage of signature-
based detection mechanisms is that they cannot detect
unknown attacks. In contrast, anomaly-based detection
methods have an advantage over signature-based meth-
ods for detecting unknown attacks, but the difficulty of
defining the rules is the main challenge of anomaly-based
detection methods.
• Software vulnerability detection: Static analysis refers
to detecting possible defects in an early stage of software,
before running the program. On the other hand, dynamic
analysis is based on executing programs. Static analysis is
usually time-consuming and finding trained professionals
for dynamic testing is difficult. Automated machine learn-
ing techniques mitigate the problem. However, machine
learning techniques for software vulnerability detection
are not accurate enough and more accurate defences are
required. In separate regard, since X-by-wire systems
are highly safety-critical, they must comply with safety
standards such as ISO 26262. Moreover, software testing
techniques must guarantee the traceability of an artifact
[166]. Thus, a more intelligent learning defence for an
accurate and precise software vulnerability detection is
of great importance.
• Malware detection: Although using machine learning
techniques for malware detection have improved detection
rate, it is still very difficult to detect all evasive malware
by traditional anti-malware strategies and more intelligent
strategies are required.
The above-mentioned security solutions have been proposed
to mitigate malicious attacks and increase the security of
vehicles. Table X associates identified attacks with the defence
mechanisms. It is apparent from this table that cryptographic
and intrusion detection techniques are recognized as well-
known and popular defence mechanisms for protecting intel-
ligent vehicles while not enough attention has been paid to
other defences such as software vulnerability detection. As
mentioned in this section, software size in intelligent vehicles
are growing dramatically, and therefore software vulnerability
detection and malware detection techniques for protecting
software in vehicles require particular attention. In general,
a specific defence mechanism is not adequate. For instance,
DoS attack on CAN bus is very different from Dos attack on
wireless vehicular communications. Therefore, a systematic
approach is needed which integrates complimentary defence
mechanisms. Cryptographic approaches are usually employed
for protecting wireless communications between road-side
units and vehicles in VANETs. Network security techniques
are appropriate for protecting ECUs as well as intrusion
detection in wireless communications. Software vulnerability
detection techniques are suitable for testing and analysis of
software before installation on the vehicle while malware
detection techniques protect them against malware after in-
stallation.
A comparative analysis of all security methods and strate-
gies is briefly illustrated in Table IX. In order to compare these
solutions, the following evaluation criteria have been used:
• Performance metrics
• Evaluation size
• Evaluation environment
The evaluations of the proposed approaches have been per-
formed regarding performance metrics. The main performance
metrics that are addressed for mitigating security attacks are as
follow: detection rate, detection time, false positive rate, false
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TABLE IX
EXPERIMENTAL OVERVIEW OF MAIN EXISTING DEFENCE MECHANISMS
Category Security solutions Performance metrics Evaluation size Evaluation environment
C
ry
pt
og
ra
ph
y
2FLIP [90] Delay, packet loss ratio, overhead 0-90 vehicles ProVerif
TESLA [66] N/A N/A N/A
RAISE [91] Message loss, delay, overhead 30-200 vehicles ns-2
PACP [92] Latency 1-100 vehicles C++
ECDSA [93] Latency 100000 test vectors Verilog
SA-KMP [94] Delay, overhead 100-1000000 users C
GKMPAN [95] Transmission overhead 75 nodes N/A
PPAA [96] Fairness N/A N/A
Calandriello et al. [97] Overhead N/A C
PPGCV [98] Transmission overhead 5km highway N/A
TACKs [99] Overhead, certificate update 3000m×3000m ns-2
GSIS [100] Delay, message loss ratio 1000m×1000m ns-2
SRAAC [101] Overhead (bandwidth, memory) N/A N/A
DABE [102] Overhead 10 nodes VanetMobiSim
ABACS [103] Overhead, delay 1000m×1000m ns-2
Xia et al. [104] Overhead 50 vehicles Real vehicles
Bouabdellah et al. [105] N/A N/A N/A
N
et
w
or
k
Se
cu
ri
ty
Bißmeyer et al. [106] DR 10 vehicles VSimRTI, JiST/SWANS
REST-Net [107] FPR, TPR, TNR 8000 vehicles VANET-Simulator
CIDS [108] FPR 3 vehicles Real vehicles
Martynov et al. [109] DR 5 nodes Tmote Sky, MoteIv
IDFV [110] DR, FPR, DT 50-300 vehicles NS-3
Song et al. [111] FPR N/A Real vehicles
Zaidi et al. [83] DR, FPR, overhead 150, 300 vehicles OMNET++, SUMO
OTIDS [112] Reply ratio, correlation coefficient 1 vehicle Real vehicles
PES [113] DR, FPR 100 nodes ns-2, GrooveNet
AECFV [84] DR, FPR, DT, overhead 50-300 nodes NS-3
Markovitz et al. [79] FPR 10-500 packets ECU simulator, Python
PML-CIDS [114] FPR, FNR 4, 8, 16 nodes N/A
So
ft
w
ar
e
V
ul
ne
ra
bi
lit
y
D
et
ec
tio
n
Tice et al. [115] Overhead 142778 instructions SPEC CPU, Chromium
Dahse and Holz [116] TPR, FPR, FNR 143 KLOC PHP
PITTYPAT [117] Overhead 122 KLOC SPEC CPU, LLVM 3.6.0
DFI [118] FPR, Overhead, throughput 80 clients SPEC CPU, SPEC WEB
FindBugs [119] N/A N/A Java
Generational Search [120] DT 197011 bytes SAGE
TaintCheck [121] FPR, overhead 1KB-10MB page size Valgring, DynamoRIO
Dytan [122] FPR 10640 attacks C
GenProg [123] FPR, FNR 1.25 mLOC C
Shin and Williams [124] Complexity, code churn 11 releases SAS v9.1.3, Weka v3.6.0
Perl et al. [125] FPR, precision 170860 commits CVEs
Zhou and Sharma [126] Precision, recall rate 3000000 commits GitHub, JIRA, Bugzilla
Shar et al. [127] FPR, recall rate 7 php applications php miner
VDiscover [128] FPR, TPR 138308 executions VDiscover
M
al
w
ar
e
D
et
ec
tio
n
MSPMD [129] DR, FPR, FNR, accuracy 10307 files Jave Development Kit
MRMR-SVMS [130] Accuracy 66703 files IDA Pro., Python
Huda et al. [131] FPR, accuracy, ROC curve 1452 files IDA Pro., Python
CloudIntell [132] ROC curve 500 files MATLAB
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TABLE X
SECURITY DEFENCES AGAINST SECURITY ATTACKS
Cryptography Network Security Software Vulnerability Detection Malware Detection
DoS X X X
DDoS X X
Black-hole X X
Replay X
Sybil X X
Impersonation X X
Malware X X X
Falsified Information X X
Timing X
negative rate, true positive rate, true negative rate, precision,
recall rate, packet delivery ratio, bit error rate, and overhead.
• (a) Detection rate (DR): This parameter indicates the ratio
of detected malicious vehicles to the total number of
malicious vehicles. As a matter of fact, detection rate
plays an important role in mitigating cybersecurity attacks
on vehicles.
• (b) Detection time (DT): This metric indicates the re-
quired time of the security mechanism to detect malicious
vehicles.
• (c) Packet delivery ratio (PDR): It is defined as the ratio
of the number of sent packets to the number of received
packets. PDR is usually used to give an estimation of the
link quality.
• (d) False positive rate (FPR): False positive rate refers to
the possibility of an alarm when there is no attack. False
positive rate is one of the most widely used parameters
in evaluating security solutions against attacks. False
negative rate (FNR), true positive rate (TPR), and true
negative rate (TNR) are other similar parameters. In
addition, accuracy, precision and recall rate are defined
based on FPR, FNR, TPR, and TNR. Table XI indicates
the formulas for calculating them [172].
• (e) Throughput: It is measured in bits per second (bps),
megabits per second (Mbps) or gigabits per second
(Gbps) and indicates the amount of data travel through a
channel. Throughput is a common metric for evaluating
medium access channel (MAC) protocols.
• (f) Bit error rate (BER): This metric is defined as the ratio
of the number of errors to the total number of bits sent.
The possibility of errors in a data transmission channel
due to noise or interference is measured by this parameter.
• (g) Overhead: This parameter indicates the amount of
resource that is required for performing a specific task
or solution. For instance, transmission overhead and
storage overhead are among important parameters for
performance evaluation of different defence mechanisms.
Future research on securing intelligent vehicles against
attacks should consider recent technologies and developments.
The next section will focus on using lightweight authenti-
cation to improve cryptography, 3GPP and software defined
security to improve network security, and deep learning to
TABLE XI
FORMULAS FOR CALCULATING ACCURACY, PRECISION, AND RECALL
RATE
Performance
metric
Formula
Accuracy (TP+TN)/(TP+TN+FP+ FN)
Precision TP/(TP+FN)
Recall rate TP/(TP+FP)
improve software vulnerability and malware detection. In fact,
computational constraints and the requirement for real-time
data transmission in intelligent vehicles are the main reasons
for choosing lightweight authentication as a future direction.
Besides, 3GPP as a new promising telecommunication stan-
dard for V2X security and software defined security (SDS)
as an efficient, adaptable and dynamic method for detecting
and mitigating security attacks are other main directions for
future studies. Finally, deep learning techniques are introduced
because they outperform machine learning solutions in terms
of attack detection accuracy. Therefore, we will consider these
developments as future directions.
V. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The research to date in the field of securing vehicles
against cybersecurity challenges has addressed a number of
security issues and proposed many security solutions, however,
there are still open challenges that need further investigation.
Future studies on the current topic are therefore recommended.
This section provides a discussion of open issues as well as
available and possible methods and technologies to further
secure intelligent vehicles. The aim of this part of the paper
is to provide future directions for research and encourage
future contributions. In this section, we outline four promis-
ing directions to further secure intelligent vehicle systems:
lightweight authentication to improve cryptography, 3GPP and
software defined security to improve network security, and
deep learning to improve software vulnerability and malware
detection.
Our main reasons for choosing these directions for future
research are as follow:
• Lightweight authentication: In the modern inter-vehicle
communications, the efficiency of authentication has be-
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come a central issue because fast-moving vehicles need
to authenticate each other as quickly as possible before
exchanging any information. Thus, we will introduce
lightweight authentication as the first future direction.
• 3GPP: Resulting from the development of V2X com-
munications, 3GPP Cellular-V2X (C-V2X) as an initial
standard completed in early 2017 to provide reliable, scal-
able, and robust wireless communications for hazardous
situations. With this in mind, C-V2X is the first step
towards 5G and this area of study was chosen for its
role in the development of network security in the future.
• Software defined security: Software defined security
is the automation of threat detection and the automatic
mitigation of attacks. Therefore, SDS is a practical way
for improving network security in vehicular networks. In
general, design principles of vehicular software defined
networking is an open issue for future research.
• Deep learning: More recent attention has focused on
using intelligent deep learning techniques in different ap-
plications such as self-driving cars and image recognition.
Deep learning methods are accurate. They outperform
not only machine learning techniques but also humans in
many tasks. Future studies on utilizing neural networks
in software vulnerability detection as well as mitigating
malware attacks on vehicles are therefore recommended.
A. Lightweight Authentication
Achieving lightweight authentication is never a trivial task
in intelligent vehicle systems. The reason is that the au-
thentication in the systems should be secure and efficient,
and it should be flexible to handle complicated transportation
circumstances [173]. As a future research direction, more
attention should be paid to lightweight authenticated key
generation protocols using communication-media signals.
In this part of the paper, three types of lightweight au-
thentication protocols including key extraction protocols using
the wireless fading channels, key establishment protocols
using the keyless cryptography technology and key distribution
protocols using the Li-Fi technology are reviewed.
1) Key Extraction from Wireless Fading Channels: To
date, various key-extraction protocols have utilized wireless
fading channels’ features at the physical layer [174]–[178].
In practical multipath environments, the signals transmitted
between two vehicles (say Alice and Bob) experience a time-
varying and stochastic fading. It is investigated that the fading
is invariant within the channel coherence time, whether the
signals are transmitted from Alice to Bob or vice versa.
Additionally, the fading decorrelates over distances of the
order of half a wavelength, i.e., λ/2. These wireless fading
channels’ characteristics ensure that: (a). two vehicles extract
a shared secret key as long as the transmitted signals are
exchanged within the channel coherence time, and (b). the
adversary cannot extract any useful information about the
extracted key (shared between Alice and Bob) using the
eavesdropped signals as long as it is more than λ/2 far away
from the two vehicles. Take the 2.4 GHz WLAN, 624 MHz
TV signals and 90 MHz FM Radio as examples [178], the half
a wavelength 2/λ = 6.25cm, 23.5 cm and 1.65 m, respectively.
Existing physical-layer key-extraction protocols were de-
signed using the Received Signal Strength (RSS) or the
Channel Impulse Response (CIR). Typically, these protocols
consist of three phases, i.e., quantization, reconciliation, and
privacy amplification. In the quantization phase, two vehicles
sample and quantize the transmitted signals, and obtain the
initial bit sequences. Due to the imperfect reciprocity and
noise, the initial bit sequences may have some mismatch bits.
Thus, the reconciliation and privacy amplification phases are
employed to remove the mismatch bits and ensure that the two
vehicles can obtain a shared secret key with high entropy.
However, the physical layer key extraction protocols cannot
be directly implemented in intelligent vehicle systems, because
in practice, the channel coherence time in vehicular environ-
ments is very short (due to the rapid change of environment).
Specifically, it is shown that the channel coherence time in
vehicular environments is about a few hundred microseconds.
Recalling that most of the existing devices operate in the half-
duplex mode, the round-trip time of transmitted signals may
be longer than the coherence time of vehicular environments.
As a result, it is full of challenges for the two vehicles to
sample packets within a duration of the short coherence time.
2) Key Establishment using Keyless Cryptography Tech-
nology: Alpern and Schneider designed a key-establishment
protocol in [179] using keyless cryptography technology, and
it was improved by [180]–[182]. In these protocols, the char-
acteristics of the anonymous channel are utilized to establish
secret keys. In the field of communication theory, the broadcast
channel can be turned into the anonymous channel if the chan-
nel achieves source indistinguishability. Technically, source
indistinguishability requires that the adversary cannot obtain
a non-negligible advantage in identifying the source of the
signals (transmitted over the channel) even using sophisticated
signal-processing technologies.
These key-establishment protocols [179]–[182] can be ab-
stracted via the following procedures:
• Alice uniformly chooses |k |2 bits at random, i.e. Ra ∈
{0, 1} |k |2 . Similarly, Bob uniformly chooses |k |2 bits at
random , i.e. Rb ∈ {0, 1} |k |2 ;
• Alice builds |k |2 messages c
1
A, c
2
A, . . . , c
|k |
2
A
using the cho-
sen bits Ra. For example, in [180], [181], the messages
ci
A
s are built by following the pre-defined rule that the
source identifier of the message ci
A
is set to be “Alice” if
Ria = 1. Otherwise, it is set to be “Bob”. Executing similar
operations, Bob builds |k |2 messages c
1
B, c
2
B, . . . , c
k
2
B using
the chosen bits Rb; and
• In the ith transmission round (where i = 1, 2, . . . , |k |),
Alice or Bob sends a message (ci
A
or ciB with equal
probability) at time ti , where ti is uniformly chosen at
random in the time interval [(i − 1)T, iT], where T is a
pre-defined system parameter.
Completing the above operations, two vehicles (say Alice
and Bob) can establish a secret key with |k | bits. To assess
the efficiency of keyless cryptography, an analysis in [182]
was conducted and keyless cryptography was compared with
Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol (as a well-known asym-
metric cryptography approach) in terms of energy and time
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consumption. The most interesting finding was that, using
IEEE 802.15.4 CSMA/CA medium access control (MAC)
protocol, keyless cryptography uses 159 times less energy than
Diffie-Hellman protocol. Moreover, establishing a secret key
with 112 bits in half-duplex mode takes 159 ms. As a matter of
fact, keyless cryptography technology needs to be improved.
Specifically, this type of key establishment protocols should
be rigorously proved secure in order to ensure the security
of the intelligent vehicle systems. Additionally, the protocols
need to be implemented in intelligent vehicle systems in order
to check their practicality.
3) Key Distribution using Li-Fi Technology: The rapid
increase of wireless data communication makes the radio
spectrum below 10 GHz become insufficient. Thus, researchers
respond to this challenge by utilizing the radio spectrum above
10 GHz. Light-fidelity (Li-Fi) provides a promising perspec-
tive: it is demonstrated that Li-Fi can achieve high speed
wireless communication, at over 3 Gb/s, from a single LED
(which uses the optimized DCO-OFDM modulation) [183],
[184].
Compared with traditional Radio-Frequency (RF) based
wireless communication technologies, Li-Fi has advan-
tages [185] including:
• Li-Fi communication naturally provides a certain level of
security, in term of avoiding interception and eavesdrop-
ping, due to the spatial confinement of the light beams.
• Li-Fi signals have a much higher signal-to-noise ratio, the
first reason is that Li-Fi technology uses high-brightness
LEDs. Besides, the distance between the transmitter and
receiver is limited in this technology.
• Li-Fi infrastructure is easier to establish due to the
wide utilization of LEDs and photodiodes. Taking the
intelligent vehicle systems as an example, many LEDs
and photodiodes have been deployed in them.
In recent years, there is an increasing interest in designing
the intelligent vehicle systems using Li-Fi technology; the
related work includes [186]–[189]. However, the research
is in its infancy, and more investigations need to be con-
ducted. Specifically, it is critical and imperative to design key-
distribution protocols using Li-Fi technology in order to ensure
the security of Li-Fi communication in intelligent vehicle
systems.
Fig. 14. V2X models
B. 3GPP on V2X Security
3GPP is assigned to create technical specification services
for LTE support of V2X (3GPP TS33.185 V15.0.0 (2018-06))
[190]. The 3GPP V2X standard will develop the specifications
for all aspects of LTE Advanced and 5G networks, including
the protocols architecture, Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V), Vehicle-
to-Infrastructure (V2I), Vehicle to Network (V2N), Vehicle to
Pedestrian (V2P) and all related security concepts for all V2X
models (Figure 14). An overview of the LTE enhancements
is presented in [190] with an emphasis on the transport of
V2X messages. This document also identifies some of the
key threats to security in V2X networks as well as proposed
mitigation methods. In addition, some preliminary security
requirements are identified to enable safe and secure com-
munication in V2X networks.
Fig. 15. Use case out of 5G coverage
A key element in V2X communication is the ability for
vehicles and roadside units to effectively and efficiently com-
municate. The 3GPP group outlines PC5 as the primary com-
munication protocol used between two autonomous cars. To
facilitate communication between the vehicle and the roadside
unit a protocol called Uu is used. The Vehicle to road-side
unit/server is carried over LTE-Uu in a payload of UDP/Ip
packets. Emphasis on effective V2X messages is important. In
order for vehicles and users to be safe, effective and efficient
exchange of information between vehicles must be achieved.
Constant communication and message exchange must be con-
ducted in real time. Since vehicles are constantly evaluating
their environment and their position, real-time communication
is important [190].
Methods to safeguard information and authenticate users
must be implemented in order to enable future V2X services.
This includes safe and secure storage of credentials and
other vital information, which must be protected from ma-
licious users. Conditional information about the vehicle such
as speed, location, heading, acceleration, and other dynamic
characteristics must be securely transmitted to roadside units
and legitimate users. Failure to propagate this information
could lead to serious incidents. In addition, compromising
information sent out by a malicious user must be immediately
identified [190].
Most V2X research is based on the LTE standard; this
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technology is currently being utilized and has been proven to
be effective, with excellent performance, high bandwidth and
low latency (up to 5 ms). 5G is the V2X enabling technology,
and it provides ultra-low latency (as low as 1 ms). This allows
a real-time response, which enables real-time warnings to be
distributed to autonomous vehicles to avoid collisions in real
time. This is key to ensuring that autonomous vehicles provide
safe and reliable transport for their users. The end-to-end
latency that is required for all real-time V2X transmissions is
less than 5 ms for message sizes of about 1600 bytes with a
probability of 99.999%. This requirement must be guaranteed
for all data traffic in real-time V2X communications. It must
be remembered on high-speed roads, relative speeds are up to
500 km/h in high-speed scenarios [191].
Handover in and out of 5G coverage is illustrated in Figure
15. It is an important aspect in supporting V2X application
with multiple Radio Access Technology (RAT) modems [192].
UEs are grouped into platoons (clusters), as UEs move through
the network it is important that platoon-related messages are
transmitted between UEs with very low latency as per re-
quirement. Thus, V2V messages needed to support platooning
application are exchanged between the UEs in the target
cell using device to device communication in 5G New RAT
(NR), even though there is no 5G coverage in the target cell
[192]. In [192], intersection safety and provisioning for urban
driving is discussed. Future applications lead to reduced traffic
congestion as traffic is routed according to traffic incidents and
conditions. An local dynamic map (LDM) is used to express
traffic signal information, pedestrian and vehicle movement
and direction and location information. 3GPP utilises the low
latency capability of 5G communications to conduct real-
time analysis of traffic conditions to reduce congestion. The
concept of intersection safety information system is illustrated
in Figure 16.
Fig. 16. Concept of intersection safety information system
1) Proposal for Secure Software Update for Electronic
Control Unit: 3GPP is proposing a car Electronic Control Unit
(ECU) which is a software module able to control the car’s
system electronics; Examples are wheel steering and brakes,
ECU has to be periodically software updatable. ECU software
updates are very important for V2X and have to undergo major
security testing. Figure 17 describes the ECU software secure
update proposal:
• UE is synchronized e.g. via Bluetooth to an ECU.
• Suppose a scenario where a car stops in a filling station
and connects following a registration procedure to a
nearby roadside unit (RSU).
• When connected, the RSU detects the software module
version of the ECU in the car via communication with the
UE and detects that an update is needed. This is based on
the list available to the RSU from a broadcast message
from a car manufacturer cloud server.
• The RSU will notify the UE that an update is required
to the ECU with a list of the updates required. The User
will be able to choose the updates required from the list
of updates for example. Also the user should be able to
reject/defer the update required to the ECU.
• If the user chooses an update to the ECU, then additional
security procedures should take place so the software
download is definitely not from a wrong source and it’s
actually the correct version.
Fig. 17. Secure software update for electronic control unit.
2) Real-time Solution to Improve Security Thereat Mitiga-
tion: 5G era will have trillions of things connected including
autonomous cars and ITS (intelligent transport systems). we
will need to get to the 5G future with intelligence, content
should be distributed to the devices that make the wireless
edge and that requires on-device AI capabilities for cars,
smartphones, sensors, and other connected things, so they can
autonomously. The 5G wireless edge will be able to reduce
latency to less the 1 msec and will lead to improved transport
safety and enhanced privacy and security.
Majority of security controls must have visibility to allow a
decision as per policy at the security control used to mitigate
the threat as at the edge, close to the source as possible, to
minimize the damage of the threat. Another future security
solution is the Network slicing end to end (in Transport in the
edge data center).
Figure 18 indicates a typical edge computing network
deployment. It should be noted that in 5G terminology, gNB
is the new name of the base station and User Plane Function
(UPF) plays the role of the data plane.
C. Software-defined Security (SDS)
Software-defined security refers to the automation of threat
detection and automatic mitigation of threats using software
defined platforms by adopting an open flow protocol, network
function virtualization (NFV) and Software defined network-
ing (SDN) which utilises the concept of a multi layered
open virtual switch with programmatic extension to enable
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Fig. 18. A typical edge computing network
automation on a large scale, in addition to the open stack
standard as a platform to manage the cloud and distributed
data centers.
Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) is the future of land-based
transport. Autonomous vehicles look to eliminate human errors
by continuously monitoring and adapting to environmental
variations. In such networks, security management is key to
ensuring safe and secure transport for occupants. The security
for the system, which includes vehicle-to-vehicle, network
and cloud security should be dynamic and adaptable. It must
continuously apply SDN analytics to identify attacks and
mitigate them quickly and effectively. Threats can be mitigated
by applying software defined security concepts that reinforce
the security policy for analysis and mitigation.
The most widely spread attacks on VANETs are DDoS
attacks. DDoS attacks with high rates of more than 1 Tera
bits/s compromise all kind of connected devices such as
laptops, tablets, smartphones, printer’s cameras, Routers and
IoT devices to part of a distributed botnet. Redirection, Fil-
tering, Blackholing, and Firewalls are the most widely used
mechanisms to counter DDoS attacks. Redirection of traffic
with an abnormal signature is done using forensic analysis.
Access control lists (ACLs) are used to filter out ping traffic.
However, it is too short to combat modern DDoS attacks.
These solutions are ineffective as they handle legitimate traffic
and traffic attacks the same way by dumping them to a black
hole.
Current systems take an unacceptably long time to recover
from DDoS attacks because they require IT personal inter-
vention and reconfigure major nodes settings and cannot be
utilised in a V2X environment. The most promising solution
is to automate the network configuration by applying soft-
ware defined networking (SDN), which uses a central point
of control and a decoupling control plan to automate the
configuration and settings for major nodes.
Based on SDN we can apply the concept of SDS, which
would decouple the mitigation plan, from the detection plan
to automate the security action and solution to mitigate attacks
and threats to any node or component within the V2X system.
SDS has to allow legitimate traffic to pass through to the
designated destination and the redirection of traffic with an
abnormal signature (Distribution, spike or abnormal emails)
to submit to a forensic analysis to extract as much as possible
information about the attack characteristics and traffic param-
eters in order to create patch file to mitigate the attack by
pushing down the patch file along the network major nodes
and devices.
Dynamically changing environments of V2X will require
dynamic software and hardware for practical implementation.
SDNs are a key piece of the V2X architecture, enabling
dynamic mitigation of security threats on the V2X network.
D. Deep Learning
One of the most important events of ImageNet Large Scale
Visual Recognition Challenge (ILSVRC) occurred in 2012
when deep learning methods outperformed shallow machine
learning methods, therefore, deep learning algorithms attracted
particular attention. Deep-learning approaches based on deep
neural-network models have indicated amazing performance
on various aspects of navigating self-driving cars using com-
puter vision [198]. Figure 19 illustrates the Image classification
results for the ImageNet challenge where the most important
progress occurred in the year 2012. The classification error
rate dropped significantly (almost 10 percent) by using con-
volutional neural networks for image recognition.
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Fig. 19. Classification error rates of ImageNet challenges
Deep-learning models and techniques such as convolu-
tional neural networks (CNN), long short-term memory
(LSTM), deep belief networks (DBN), deep Boltzmann ma-
chines (DBM), multilayer perceptron (MLP), autoencoder-
based methods, and sparse coding-based methods are based
on training neural networks with a training set. After training
the neural network, it recognizes the patterns and classifies
a different set of examples called a test set [199]. In deep-
learning models, there are many layers between the input and
output layers for finding features.
Along with this growth in deep learning, however, there
is increasing concern over its computational complexity and
traceability:
• Computational complexity: The most important limitation
of deep neural networks lies in the fact that these ap-
proaches have a heavy computational load which prevents
their use in many practical applications, especially on
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TABLE XII
DEEP LEARNING DEFENCES
Method Key deep learning idea Advantages Disadvantages
Loukas et al. [193] Uses computation offloading method for a
deep learning-based intrusion detection
Energy efficiency, low detection la-
tency
Continuous connectivity is required
DQN [194] Uses combination of Q-learning and deep
learning
Accelerates learning process Computational complexity, takes
long time to make a decision
Loukas et al. [195] Uses MLP and RNN for classification Real test bed, high accuracy Not suitable for simple attacks or
onboard intrusion detection
Li et al. [168] Uses BLSTM for software vulnerability de-
tection
High accuracy Computational complexity
HaddadPajouh et al. [196] Uses LSTMs to detect malware Learning information from previ-
ous steps
LSTMs are not suitable for simple
patterns
CDT-DBN & DDT-DBN
[197]
Uses DBN for training unlabeled data and
an ANN for training labeled data
Fast and simplified training model Computational complexity for
learning RBMs
Fig. 20. Input layer, hidden layers, and output layer in deep learning
resource constrained vehicle nodes. Thus, recently many
learning algorithms have been proposed for increasing
the efficiency of deep-learning methods but, having said
that, they often suffer from low classification accuracy.
Therefore, this is an important issue for future research
[200].
• Traceability: It is generally infeasible to know what fea-
tures a deep neural network is using to make predictions
on a big dataset. As shown in Figure 20, the lack of
traceability is due to using hidden factors for modeling
the complicated relationship between the input variables
and the output variables [201].
1) Deep Learning Defences: In this part of the paper,
a number of significant and well-known deep-learning ap-
proaches for securing various aspects (intrusion detection, soft-
ware vulnerability detection, malware detection) of intelligent
vehicular systems are reviewed and compared with each other.
Loukas et al. [193] proposed a cloud-based intrusion detec-
tion defence mechanism in order to achieve energy efficiency
and performance. The authors addressed the shortcomings of
existing methods for continuous tasks of vehicles such as intru-
sion detection in terms of energy consumption and processing
limitations. Therefore, they proposed computational offloading
for these tasks. This means, that the problem of computa-
tional complexity for vehicles deep-learning approaches can
be solved by offloading computation. As a case study, the
authors focused on deep-learning-based intrusion detection
mechanism for a robotic vehicle. In this way, a Recurrent Neu-
ral Network (RNN) with Long Short Term Memory (LSTM)
as the intrusion detection system has been employed. In order
to address the inherent security and privacy risks in cloud
computing, the HTTPS protocol has been selected for client-
server communications; nevertheless, it should be noted that
continuous connectivity between the vehicle and the server is
another challenge of computation offloading, especially due to
the bandwidth variability while vehicles move from one place
to another.
Xiao et al. [194] have proposed a deep Q-network (DQN)
based power allocation strategy. DQN combines Q-learning
and deep learning against smart attacks on UAVs. Achieving
the optimal power allocation is the main purpose of this
scheme. To this end, a reinforcement-learning-based power
allocation strategy was proposed. At first, the presented DQN-
based method makes use of game theory to formulate inter-
action between Eve and the UAV transmission as a PT-based
smart attack game, and the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of the game
has been derived. Then, in order to find an optimal power-
allocation strategy, the DQN learning-based power allocation
method has been applied. In fact, the DQN is a convolutional
neural network (CNN) which consists of two convolutional
layers and two fully connected layers.
Loukas et al. [195] have proposed a deep learning de-
fence mechanism against intrusion. Recurrent neural networks
(RNN) and a multilayer perceptron (MLP) are proposed,
both of which are considered as well-known artificial neural
networks. The basic RNN is a neural network with feedback;
hence, backpropagation is not suitable for training. The hidden
layer of the RNN includes a Long Short-Term Memory
(LSTM), a dense layer and a sigmoid activation function.
Memorizing and forgetting the past in the learning process are
two important characteristics of LSTMs. The hidden layer(s)
of the proposed MLP makes use of leaky rectified linear
units (LReLU) as the activation function. MLP is an example
of feed-forwarding deep learning and has been proposed to
make a comparison between RNN (with LSTM) and MLP.
Furthermore, offloading infrastructure has been proposed to
tackle the resource limitations of mobile vehicles. In order
to evaluate the proposed approaches, denial of service (DoS),
command injection and malware attacks were launched on a
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real robotic vehicle. The proposed methods provide a strong
defence against intrusion but, having said that they are not
suitable for simple attack classification or onboard intrusion
detection.
Li et al. [168] applied deep-learning models to detect
software vulnerabilities. First, a code gadget was defined as
a composition of a number of relative program statements
dependent on the same data or control flow. Then static
analysis was used to extract features about library calls from
the code gadget. A Bidirectional LSTM (BLSTM) network
was selected as the classifier because LSTM could address
the Vanishing Gradient (VG) problem and BLSTM could
record the effect of code statements from two directions.
Experimental results showed that the model achieved 5.7%
false-positive and 7.0% false negative rate. The result indicates
that a deep learning network may achieve better performance
than traditional machine-learning models.
HaddadPajouh et al. [196] have put forth a deep Recurrent
Neural Network (RNN) based defence in order to detect
malware attacks. Inasmuch as the majority of Unix System-V
IoT devices use ARM processors, the authors have focused on
analyzing ARM-based IoT applications’ execution operation
codes (OpCodes). The proposed approach has used an ELF
parser to extract the OpCodes of malware and benign files.
After feature selection and removing redundant features (Op-
Codes), Long Short-Term Memory has been utilized for detect-
ing IoT malware samples based on the sequences of OpCodes.
In this way, three LSTM models with different configurations
have been examined. It should be remembered that LSTMs
are suitable for learning long-term dependencies due to their
ability to forget, remember and update the information. In the
final analysis, the detection accuracy of the proposed method
is 98%.
A recent study [197] has attempted to design a defence
model against malware attacks on the industrial cloud-assisted
internet of things (CoT) using deep-belief networks (DBNs).
The authors have argued that standard industrial-control sys-
tem (ICS) malware detection systems are not able to defend
against the unknown behavior of malware, and ICSs based
on CoTs require advanced malware detection systems. The
sandbox environment is proposed for detecting the run-time
behavior of malware and dynamic feature extraction based on
API calls. It should be mentioned that DBN based methods
do not require feature reduction. The proposed DBN consists
of one visible unit and two hidden units. The computed
weights from the DBN have been transformed to an artificial
neural network (ANN) for initialization, then the ANN is
trained using only labeled data. Two detection models based
on deep belief networks have been proposed. The first model
makes use of disjoint training and testing sets (DDT-DBN).
The second model trains a DBN with new unlabeled data to
provide the DBN with additional knowledge about changes
in the malicious attack patterns (CDT-DBN). The proposed
defence mechanisms have been tested against different types of
Trojans, worms, and viruses. In the final analysis, the detection
accuracy of the proposed models is 99%.
In Table XII, the key idea, advantages, and disadvantages
of deep learning defences are illustrated.
2) Real-time Simulation and Formal Verification: On a
separate regard, the industry is adopting real-time simula-
tion and formal verification as part of security compliance
check for intelligent vehicles [78], [202], [203]. In real-time
simulation, computer models are used to accurately re-create
repetitive and flexible test environment for vehicular systems
[160] while formal verification provides security guarantee
[204], [205]. As a promising future direction, deep learning
based models can be combined with real-time simulation and
formal verification to provide more rigid yet accurate security
assurance.
3) Deep Learning On Edge Computing: As illustrated
earlier, one of the main drawbacks of deep learning approaches
is computational complexity. Due to more datasets, cloud com-
puting was a convenient solution for deep learning approaches.
However, a major problem with this kind of application is huge
data traffic and latency. In general, therefore, it seems that
the distribution of computation between the nodes is a better
idea. With this intention, in recent years edge computing or
fog computing for the internet of things has been introduced
[206]. The term “Fog Computing” the first time used by Cisco
and generally understood to mean extending cloud computing
to the edge of the network. It should be noted that low
latency, geographical distribution, real-time interaction, sup-
port of mobility, and wireless access are the most significant
characteristics of fog computing networks [207].
In particular, exchanging safety critical information in the
Internet of Vehicles (IoV) and its supporting platform [208] be-
tween connected vehicles and roadside units need to minimize
latency. With this in mind, mobile edge computing provides an
important opportunity for deep learning applications to extend
the connected car cloud to be close to the vehicles without
sending data to distant servers [209].
E. Summarising Future Directions
With the emerging and developing Internet of Things and
Internet of Vehicles, the biggest challenge for intelligent
vehicles in the future is security. By comparing the proposed
directions for future security solutions it is obvious that they
are usually light, fast, or intelligent. Therefore, they provide
an appropriate environment for developing more adaptable and
complicated security defences with high performance, meeting
security requirements in the vehicles.
VI. VALIDITY DISCUSSION
There are always some threats to the validity of the results
in any research study as to the findings of this survey paper.
As a matter of fact, it is possible that some limitations have
influenced this review paper. Herein, some of these limitations
and threats have been discussed:
• Limitation of the approach: Due to brevity, we only
selected a few interesting and major security attacks. The
scope of attacks is nowhere close to exhaustive. But we
hope the solutions provided for these attacks can provide
some generalizable solutions for other attacks, which are
not covered here.
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• Solutions covered: Once again, our solutions chosen are
nowhere exhaustive, but we have chosen them based on
our research capabilities from all possible collaborations
for the manuscript. We hope the solutions, though in-
evitably limited, can provide some research insight into
securing the intelligent vehicle systems.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this review paper, we have surveyed securing state-of-the-
art vehicles and discussed the architecture of intelligent vehi-
cles. The purpose of this paper was to focus on security issues
and the ways to deal with them accordingly. Therefore, we
have stated the security requirements of vehicular networks, a
number of security attacks on intelligent vehicle systems and
challenges related to them. Moreover, the security defences
have been classified regarding their effectiveness against these
identified attacks. Our major purpose was to discover some
advantages and shortcomings of the proposed defences. Fi-
nally, we comprehensively reviewed and discussed potential
defences and directions for the future in order to further secure
intelligent vehicle systems and their communications. This
survey paper provides a good foundation for researchers who
are interested to gain an insight into the security issues of
intelligent vehicles and the proposed solutions. As future work,
we plan to implement these proposed defence mechanisms for
an international vehicle company and conduct some extensive
experiments.
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